Strong Societies and Weak States: Zimbabwe

A recent article in the Economist ("Piling on the Agony," Dec 3, 2008) details the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. A cholera epidemic is the latest in a long line of typically human-induced tragedies (e.g. famine, hyperinflation, post-election violence) that have their roots in political mismanagement. Zimbabwe is the paragon of a weak state in the Third World, whose government is more concerned with maintaining its hold on power than it is with promoting the general welfare of its people and otherwise fulfilling the basic duties of a state. The obvious reference is to Migdal's Strong Societies and Weak States. Migdal's theory is able to explain some of the political actions that President Robert Mugabe (who has been in power continuously since the 1980s) has taken to maintain his hold on power. In particular, it highlights the government's close but tenuous relationship with the military and the intentional manipulation of political appointments.

It is too soon to tell if such unrest will resume and spread or if the authorities will contain the soldiers’ anger by giving them extra perks while crushing a mutinous few. But it is plain that soldiers, the ultimate guarantor of Robert Mugabe’s power, are no longer shielded from inflation, running at hundreds of millions percent. Thousands have been told to work on farms. Many are deserting. The senior ranks—colonels and upwards—still benefit from access to farms and minerals and other business privileges, and are probably still loyal to Mr Mugabe. But a question-mark may soon start to hang over junior officers.

There are a few things to note here. The first is that the military is the ultimate guarantor of Mugabe's power. When you have rigged elections and presided over political, economic, and social crises (for over twenty years) you are bound to be an unpopular man. It is not surprising then that Mugabe would have to resort to military power to protect himself, and that he would invest so much into it rewarding and sanctioning the senior ranks in order to keep them on his side. It would be interesting to know whether they are still going to be loyal to him if, in the midst of this economic crisis, he is unable to offer them the same level of rewards they were receiving in the past. The second thing to note is the role of the junior officers, who are probably much closer than the senior officers to the society as a whole, and thus may be key to implementing the state's will in society. Their allegiance matters too.

Almost three months after a power-sharing deal was signed, there is little hope that a new government will be in place soon. Violence against the opposition continues. After more talks in South Africa, the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change at least agreed on a constitutional amendment providing for a new post of prime minister, to be held by the MDC’s leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. It will take at least another month for the change to get Parliament’s nod and be enacted. Moreover, several big issues are outstanding, including how ministries and provincial governorships will be divided among the rival parties, who will be part of a new National Security Council, and what it will do. Negotiations are expected to resume later this month. Meanwhile, Mr Mugabe has unilaterally reappointed Gideon Gono, the central bank governor presiding over the world’s highest inflation rate, for another five years.

The main competing power center in Zimbabwe politics has been the opposition party (Movement for Democratic Change) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, who was recently promised partial control of government after the contested elections this year. If you hadn't taken CPS, you might wonder why so much wrangling occurs the prime ministership and other lesser posts in government. Why doesn't strongman Mugabe just concede those seats and go on with business as usual? The most amusing question to me is, why on earth Mugabe would appoint Gideon Gono, obviously so incompetent in his post, for another five years? It all begins to make sense when you think of government positions as constituting a competing center of power; Mugabe is afraid that if (relatively) competent people come into power, they may become more popular and legitimate than him and constitute a threat to his hold on power.

There are other theories that can be used to explain the situation in Zimbabwe that deserve brief mention. The fact that it is an illiberal democracy means that Robert Mugabe probably had little interest in maintaining popular support in the first place. It doesn't matter very much how popular you are if you are going to win the election. But I will leave that for you to discuss.

"Democracy and the Downturn"

From the Economist, Nov 15 - Nov 21 2008, "Democracy and the Downturn"

I thought this was an interesting article because it examines poling data from the Latinobarometro poll of South and Central American peoples' views of their governments. Historically, this is a region which has not seen strong democracies until very recently, and even now many of those democracies may not be considered entirely free--demonstrated, for example, by the recent elections in Nicaragua.

The Latinobarmetro poll does show that, since the poll in 2001 (which is when they had their last economic crisis) people's faith in democracy in 12 of the 16 states surveyed has increased. However, only in 5 states have those numbers exceeded the 1996 poll--and those nations are ones which have seen recent democratic victories, such as success against Hugo Chavez's referendum for constitutional change in Venezuela, or Alvaro Uribe's success against the FARC, or in Paraguay where the long ruling Colorado Party was displaced by the election of Fernando Lugo.

The worry is, with the current global economic crisis deepening, whether or not these democratic successes and faith in the democratic system will continue. In many of these states, people adopt a performance legitimacy view, and the numbers of this year were taken before the effects of the crisis had fully unraveled. If their governments are unable to deal with the crisis, that may produce openings for strongmen like Chavez to take control.

Indeed, half of those polled stated that they would not mind a non-democratic government if it solved economic problems; a similar proportion said that democracy has not reduced inequalities in the region; while another 30% said there was not equality before the law.

I think this poll helps give understanding to the importance not just of democratic institutions, but of economic stability and rule of law in establishing democratic rule. In many poor Central American states, democracy has never been able to fully take hold because of the deep rooted socioeconomic inequalities--70% polled agreed that governments favor the interests of the privileged few. It remains to be seen whether Latin America will be able to consolidate its recent democratic gains, and speak out against those losses as in Nicaragua. If the current economic crisis is to be weathered without social and political upheaval, democracy may be the best tool of addressing inequality in the region--but only if those democratic institutions represent the interests of all.

pentagon policy reflects changing lanscape of conflict around the world

A recent Washington Post article outlined new Pentagon policy aimed at countering many of the new types of conflict facing the United States and the world. Using the term “irregular warfare,” the Pentagon is purportedly reallocating resources from “traditional combat” to more unconventional conflict, in addition to greater cooperation with foreign security forces and polities.

While I’m certainly no security studies expert, I would venture that this readjustment of the arguably most powerful force on the planet must reflect some significant shift in the nature of conflict around the world, and not just those conflicts in which the U.S. is in someway engaged. Admittedly, part of the readjustment is the result of the asymmetric power wielded by the U.S. military and those who would challenge it, forcing terrorists, etc to resort to nontraditional methods of engagement. At the same time, part of the readjustment may be attributed to the rise in “minor conflicts” as quantified by the UCDP reports discussed in lecture. Not only does the shift in policy reflect the vast increase in the ratio of minor to major conflict, but also the changing nature of conflict. The report cited in the Washington Post article identifies challenges such as terrorist networks, drug cartels and other non-state actors as now meriting as much Pentagon attention and resources as traditional enemy combatants. In support of the findings of Laitin and Fearon, the report identifies environments of “weak and failing” states as presenting the greatest threat to international security.

Another interesting reading of this article might be from the perspective of globalization theories. The new Pentagon Policy seeks to establish a “global network” of official security forces and intelligence agencies, aided presumably by rapidly sharing information. Moreover, more focus is being placed on language training for U.S. military personnel. All of this is in an effort to bolster local security forces abroad, in hopes that strong and secure states will provide less opportunity for threats like Al-Qaeda to develop.

Parliamentary System... No thanks.

In “Harper Suspends Canada Parliament to Avert Defeat,” Theophilos Argitis and Greg Quinn discuss the situation in Canada whereby its Parliament is at odds with its Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. The situation is so critical that Parliament is threatening to replace the current government with a new coalition. Harper has responded by suspending Parliament to stave off such an occurrence.
This situation represents both the positives and negatives of proportional parliamentary representation. On one hand, it shows the flexibility of the system to replace leaders who are at odds with the will of the people. Harper reneged on his campaign promise to address labor rights and political funding. Furthermore, many feel he is not doing an adequate job addressing the current economic crisis. Thus, members of the opposition parties and some from his own Conservative Party feel strongly that he should be replaced. Therefore, by the end of this process, Canada, in theory, should have a new Prime Minister who will better serve the interests of the nation.
On the other hand, this trait of a parliamentary system leads to a diversion from the actual issues plaguing the nation. As the top story facing Canada now, its politicians are focused entirely on what the prospects are of the challenge. This struggle, as a result of the hyper-competitiveness between parties in a multi-party proportional representation system, has led to a virtual shutdown of Canada’s government as Harper suspended Parliament in an effort to avoid being ousted.
Thus, while proportional representation gives many groups a voice in the political process, it also increases the chances of political dialogue which can cripple government progress.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a3JbAFqGjgoM&refer=home

African violence = ethnic violence?

In their article “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Brubaker and Laitin argue that two major factors have caused the more recent ethnicization of conflicts that entail the use of violence. According to them the first is the “decay of the Weberian state” whereby the state is incapable of repressing violence of any kind, including ethnic violence. The second is the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and, with it, the ideological framing of conflicts.

In the news today, the front page of The New York Times runs a story headlined “Rwanda Stirs Deadly Brew of Troubles in Congo” that lacks any form of non-ethnic reasoning. The article focuses on Rwanda’s past ethnic struggles and the role that the Congo has played in sheltering ex-genocidaires. It states how “mainly Tutsi” Rwandan soldiers are streaming into the Congo to pay back the Hutus that “want to come back and finish the job.” What is mentioned but never emphasized is that this conflict has a backdrop of a struggle for power and natural resources. Rwanda is a small state highly populated and perennially poor, while its large neighbor, although one of the poorest states in Africa, has a natural supply of valuable minerals and resources that give it a large potential for wealth. For the last decade, the Congo has been in a constant state of unrest fueled by various political agendas, as well as conflicts over the control of water and other resources.

The heavy death toll in the Congo over the last 10 years reaches now to over 5.4 million, the deadliest since World War II. While the article mentions that the Rwandan genocide launched the then Zaire into turmoil due to the heavy influx of refugees, it fails to mention that the vast majority of these deaths have been non-violent losses – caused by malnutrition and preventable health conditions that were untended during the turmoil. Instead, the article would make it appear as though the conflict is a continuation of Rwandan genocide when over 800,000 Tutsis were killed for being Tutsis in 100 days.

Therefore, I argue that, as Brubaker and Laitin contend, the Congo is incapable of repressing the rebel forces at all - either helped by Rwandans or not. Unfortunately, its own Congolese military is blamed for much of the looting and raping of women in Goma. Furthermore, with the scar of an appalling ethnic conflict in the region it easy to categorize the violence in an ethnic framework. It appears that this classification has finally brought attention to the conflict that has been waging for the last 10 years. Yet, it may be problematic if policy makers try to diffuse tensions between ethnic groups rather than supply healthcare and food for the hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees within the country, both Hutu and Tutsi.

YAY BIG BOOK.

To say the very least, Strong Societies and Weak States is not light reading. I’m not going to lie; in trudging through these 277 pages, I have only developed a perfunctory understanding of the intricacies of Migdal’s thesis. I don’t seriously believe any one of use can really figure what exactly what his model is and rationalize the various case studies that he has used to support his thesis.
In the most abbreviated encapsulation, this book seeks to examine why it is that a majority of Third World countries have been mired in what appears to be a constant process state disintegration following postcolonial nation building. By drawing heavily from the cases of Israel, Sierra Leone, and Egypt, and sampling liberally from countries such as Mexico, India, Nigeria, South Africa and others, Migdal develops a model centered on the relation between localized interests (power brokers, chieftains, etc.) and the state apparatus, and the struggle to define the policies of the nation-state in a way that leads to change in society as achieving greater prosperity, dignity, and equity.
In particular, I found the case studies of Israel and Sierra Leone to be particularly fascinating. Both countries were former British possessions, and were left in a state of intense fragmentation and general chaos following independence. Summarizing, it seems that an inflow of funds and resources in both countries created distinctly different results because they fell into different hands. In the case of Israel, Zionist labor leaders transferred funds into the Histradut and gave Ben-Gurion the necessary resources to unite Palestine under the Israeli flag. However, in Sierra Leone, British dismantling of traditional power arrangements and the haphazard transferring of resources to local chieftains created a society ripe for fragmentation. As such, over the course of the post-colonialism period, Sierra Leone has lacked a strong state apparatus because the national leaders have had to accommodate towards the demands of localized power brokers. This in turn has curtailed the effectiveness of the state to develop an effective bureaucracy barring some jarring social dislocation.
This I can deal with. I do have one question, however. In all the states analyzed, it seems that only Israel succeeded. What about cases such as China (you knew I would pick that)? Following the Second World War, it was not the inflow of resources from Japanese imperialists or Americans that created the climate for a strong state. In fact, for all the money that the U.S. dumped into the Nationalists, the Communists (who were comparatively underfunded by the Russians) still managed to prevail and create a strong state from a nation fragmented for over a hundred years.
All in all, I don’t disagree with Migdal’s thesis because quite frankly, I don’t understand it to the point of argument. However, I would have appreciated if he presented a couple more successful Third World models. Other than that, it’s definitely better than reading the toothpaste container in the bathroom.

Strength of the State

In Joel Migdal’s work Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World he discusses the reasons why most Third World countries have failed to become strong states. He expresses the importance of colonial backgrounds and influences from former parent countries. These states existed primarily to provide for the needs of the 18^th and 19^th parent states’ economies, thus their local financial and social well-being was not a crucial concern to imperialists thousands of miles away. How, then, can a state with such a background move forward to effectively govern its varied peoples?

The imperialists’ lack of foresight in most of the nations they occupied led to strong internal divisions, which have complicated and prevented much state development. They did not concern themselves with negotiating between local ethnic or tribal groups. These groups, they did not understand, are vital to the maintenance of state control beyond the key cities. As Migdal points out, “strong Third World societies, then, are not mere putty to be molded by states with sufficient technical resources, managerial abilities, and committed personnel” (36). Such a statement is proven not only in colonial society, but also in today’s world. When one considers the situation in Iraq, such a statement is especially true. A strong state, Midgal would contend, requires that its leaders understand and work with the various minority groups within its borders. He states that as Third World countries are noticeably more ethnically diverse than First World countries.

The best way for leaders to do so is to construct political agencies with the power to make large scale strategic choices affecting all of the separate groups in the country. These agencies would need to be far reaching and capable of understanding the multitude of interests in regions that may be far from the seat of government. Only through these can a government hope to simultaneously consolidate and expand its power to effectively maintain central social and political control.

Joel Migdal presents a fascinating, or at least engaging, investigation of the power relationship between states and the societies they supposedly govern. Beyond arguing for the central role thrust upon the developing state by the international community (more specifically the U.N. and the Bretton Woods organizations), Migdal emphatically stresses the importance and failure of the state in mobilizing the societies over which they preside. This abandonment of the traditional approaches to examining the problems of development presents a refreshing perspective to field that seems mired in somewhat static, institutionalized, if not outright crusty theories.

Although clearly eschewing the traditional theories of development (for which he into be credited), Migdal cannot help but to look to Europe for examples of successful states engaging their societies in a vein similar to that of the Modernitzationists. In fact, Migdal picks out three "tentacles" intrinsic to the early modern European state that allowed it to channel social behavior: strong standing armies, an established judicial system, and an efficient tax-collection apparatus. Migdal credits the failure of states to effectively develop themselves with the absence of these and/or innovative ways of engaging society and instead reverting to the "politics of survival".

Although he supports his assertions with ample data, I feel that the state-side emphasis in approaching questions of development might be slightly limiting of our imagination, even if it is a fresh departure from other models. While Migdal certainly makes an excellent case for state engagement of societies, he overlooks the certain social movements and institutions that have developed outside the auspices of the state but still have proven beneficial in realizing the goals of development. Though they might be small and rather uncommon, small scale pooling of resources and entry into fair trade initiatives have proven very effective in raising the living standards of limited populations. Admittedly, for such social organizations to have any hope of truly flourishing, they must enjoy a secure environment and sufficiently maintained (much less present) infrastructure – ultimately responsibilities of the state. Thus, while Migdal correctly note the lack of state engagement, I would suggest a less antagonistic characterization of society in impeding the state’s ability to impose the rules that are to channel societal behavior; while empowerment of the state is a good a necessary component, we should be wary of overlooking the ingenuity of the people.

The necessary conditions for a strong state

In “Strong Societies and Weak Societies” Robert Migdal argues that for new states to form, there must be subversion of old methods and modes of survival (140). However, he also writes that there are certain other criteria that facilitate in the creation of a strong state. Two of these in particular are up for debate and discussion: the importance of an outside military threat and the world historical timing of the new state’s creation. These are valid points in some cases, but do not always hold up to the paradigm he establishes.
The role of a military threat in this process has proven important in many cases; however, it does not ensure state consolidation. An interesting case, or set of cases, upon which to test this idea is Africa. Very few African states fall into the category of a strong state. Many of these states have not faced a serious outside military threat because there is a lack of solid military forces in Africa on the whole. As a result, there is little incentive to take the risks towards state consolidation about which Migdal writes..
The other point up for discussion is the idea of the historical timing of the state change. This premise may very well hold true, but it is based on a good deal of assumptions. First, it assumes that ideas do have a causal quality and are influential in politics. This point has been up for debate for a long time in political discourse, and it is hard to take it for granted. Also, it is hard to posit that there are concentrated movements throughout history where these ideas have a stronghold on the world. Often there are movements of thinking, but it is a bit sweeping to claim that one ideologies becomes dominant in thinking.
Migdal opens an interesting discussion and makes many valid points about the relationship between societies and states. It is imperative to focus in, since his work deals with a multi-faceted issue.

(Nation) States and Societies

In Strong States and Weak Societies, Migdal makes a largely empirical argument for what he sees as the axis of Third-World development: the nexus between what are often newly formed governments, and the existing social structures over (and through) which they seek to exert their influence. He incorporates into this narrative a polemic against existing Development Theory - especially the "teliological" type - and instead proposes a different model for explaining and predicting state development, one predicated on historical levels and form of "social dislocation." Essentially, he posits, the more fragmented a country's society has become, the greater the tendency for power to be distributed away from central government, and into the hands of "strongmen" and other local authorities.

Yet, despite his extensive use of sociological arguments, Migdal loses sight of some key variables by ignoring the teliological perspective out-of-hand. In other words, by focusing so closely on the Third-World, he is able to identify differences and distinctions among the nations which comprise it; but his work would be better served (and, incidentally, constitute a better refutal of teliological hypotheses and Modernization Theory) if he also examined distinctions between those states and their First-World cousins. Instead, he concludes with what, by his own admission, is a bit of a truism - if not a tautological argument: "a society fragmented in social control...affects the state, which, in turn, reinforces the fragmentation of society."

This is a theory of government, not development - all societies were, at one time or another, "fragmented." Migdal provides an accurate diagnosis, but without contextual differentiation. The impetus for moving out of this state of fragmentation, according to Aristotle, Locke, and any number of thinkers, is human progress; thus, according to the former, humans will gradually aggregate into larger communities, and ultimately the state itself. This premise came to form the basis of Western thought, working itself out throught the Middle Ages and eventually coming to a head in the establishment of the Westphalian model (further solidified with the rise of liberal democracy).

No such philosophical foundation existed in much of the Third-World; many colonial states, with several exceptions, became "states" only by virtue of imperially drawn borders. They were not built upon popular recognition of the need to aggregate towards common progress, but instead established from the top-down. Social dislocation and fragmentation in modern states may be in part due to the "spread of the world economy" and all it brought with it; but even before that spread, most Latin American and African societies were far from anything we could today call a "nation-state." And while colonialism no doubt interrupted the process by which such states were formed in the West, this can hardly be compensated for in bypassing the median stages of development.

My argument, then, is this: Migdal's identification of social fragmentation, and its impact on the development of central state authority -and v.v.- is convincing (at least as far as I understand it). In limiting his examination to the Third-World, however, he overlooks the distinctions that may be drawn with other nations (and used to refute the teliological arguments he so despises). The process of aggregating citizens into states - especially democratic ones - relies on more than just the exercise of authority, in the ability to "penetrate, regulate, extract, and appropriate"; these powers must be complemented by, and indeed arise from, certain intangibles. Call it patriotism, nationalism, consent of the governed - these are the intangibles that bind fragmented populations together into body-politics, whence the true strength of government is derived.

China From the Eyes of a Chinaman

For the uninitiated, The Elephant and the Dragon does a great job of introducing the key concepts surrounding the extraordinary rise of China and India in the last three decades. Key drivers in this economic modernization period, such as the development of a global supply chain in response to information technology linking faraway places in seconds and massive influx of direct foreign investment, are well explained and the repercussions of such developments covered in considerable detail. That being said, having been engaged in business with my family in China since I was a toddler and done considerable concentrated study on contemporary China policy, I feel that certain factors that Meredith attributes to China’s growth need reconsidering. One is the idea that there is an endless supply of cheap labor in the Chinese market.
Since I was five, my parents have been engaged in the “disassembly process” that Meredith details, working as not only a finisher of promotional goods, but also doing distribution here in the United States. T-shirts, duffel bags, backpacks, umbrellas; we do a little bit of everything. In the last five years, if there is one thing we have noticed, it is that labor costs have been increasing by an unbelievable amount annually. On the latest trip back this summer, my second uncle on my mother’s side (who runs the factory), lamented the fact that only a decade ago, workers would be lined up outside the factory seeking to find work. These days, laborers skilled with sewing machines are hard to come by, and small factories like ours that manage to bring some new workers in from Hunan and train them, will usually get them taken away by larger factories with better pay and amenities.
This by no means is a bad thing; China without a doubt needs this rise of standard in living as a country on the rise. However, Meredith tends to overemphasize the fact that cheap labor exists in China. Leninist country or not, the Chinese economy is subject to the same macro-effects of other markets, and the boom in production has led to what is looking to be an acute shortage of trained labor. I think part of this comes from the fact that Meredith is not an academic, but instead a journalist. Her aim is to drive home the fact that China and India are indeed booming, and in that sense she succeeds.
Delving further, I did a little independent research on the current state of investment within China. An interesting article I found in the China Briefing (http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2008/04/11/south-china-factories-on-the-move-%E2%80%93-relocation-has-begun.html), a newspaper dedicated to business in the country, had an interesting article about how South China (Guangdong and Fujian province), once the epicenter of cheap manufacturing (as described repeatedly by Meredith), has now seen a flight of factories away from the area, due to shortage of labor and increased governmental control. Just around our factory in Huadu, by a rough count this summer, I’ve seen about half of the factories close down, mostly those that specialize in secondary production (what we refer to in the industry as 加工 or added production). Having written a paper for this in my China Domestic Policies course with Professor Sutter, I’ve identified four causes for this downturn that really can be applied throughout China.
1. Decline in value-added tax refund- in the past, to encourage investment, the government would provide a rebate on a value added tax for goods domestically used in production. Each layer of production would get a VAT, and if the final good was being shipped out of the country, there would be a fat discount. However, in recent years, to curb inflation, the government cut down most of these rebates. In the recent stimulus package approved by the central government, these rebates are back, but it remains to be seen how much of a positive effect this is going to have in the medium and long term.
2. Appreciation of the yuan versus the dollar- around 2005, after increased pressure from the U.S. government, China finally began to de-peg it’s currency against the dollar. From a standard of about 8.3, we have now seen an increase in value of the RMB to 6.8. This has made Chinese goods much less competitive, and increased the costs of importing inputs from outside of the country (remember, it’s a GLOBAL supply chain).
3. Increased consumption of raw material inputs and the associated rise in costs- well, with so many factories working in China, particularly in fossil fuel related goods (nylon, phlalates or the things used to make rubber duckies and dildos soft) there has been a sharp jump in the costs of inputs. Another issue has been government regulations, which by seeking to damper the rising price of oil, flooded the market with subsidies. This had the effect of resulting in distortion in supply, increasing costs in the market for by-products.
4. Labor costs are going up!- as described before, labor costs are going up. Why? Well, there just seems to be a shortage of skilled workers. As Meredith describes, family workers have sent money home to families in impoverished villages. These amounts, though low by dollar standards, represent the combined income for whole families. Another factor has been the passage of new labor laws by the Chinese government. Ilooked at them this summer; they are confusing, contradictory, and while a step in the right direction, result in rising costs.
From my last point, I have one more quibble regarding Meredith’s book. In one section, she describes the daily wages of laborers in dollar amounts. The effect is that the unknowledgeable reader will voice shock at how low cruel, evil factory owners are paying exploited laborers. Unfortunately, what the fail to realize is that there is the buying power of one yuan in China is the equivalent of one dollar in the U.S., and Meredith’s wages when converted to yuan actually seem pretty reasonable. That $245 a month wage becomes almost 2000 RMB. While this might not be wealthy by any standards, it represents a considerable step up in earnings by workers. Give the market some time, and let China run it’s course. In my opinion, it is only a matter of time before China must begin it’s period of political liberalization. This is for it’s very own survival.

Reform and Openess in China

In Gallagher’s study on China’s “reform and openness”, we see the great degree to which economic reforms and political liberalization are not necessarily linked. China’s political reforms essentially attempt to facilitate economic development and not democratization. They serve to improve the efficiency of the existing political system and not obliterate it. With a history of devastating wars and chaotic revolutions, it is not surprising that we see China take on a gradual, experimental and accumulative approach rather than employ the shock therapy approach and suffer its paralyzing effects.

FDI liberalization has been employed as a pivotal tool to unleash competitive pressures and allow ideological reformulation. The former minimizes the ability of affected groups to mobilize themselves as a credible counter-force while the latter transforms the debate between public and private industries to one that concerned the nationalistic need to strengthen a Chinese industry to confront foreign competition. By doing so, the Chinese regime retains its legitimacy through “shielding itself from accusations that it has sold out socialism”, justifying that drastic political reforms such as a transition to democracy is not necessary. In the realm of the economy, the debate on socialism and capitalism is clearly not an issue for economic development.

FDI liberalization has demonstrated itself to be less politically destabilizing to a reforming socialist regime in China’s case because it did not directly challenge the most recalcitrant interest groups under socialism. It instead led to the gradual corroding of resistance among competing firms on the regional and local level and even among state enterprises which experience losing out on the chance to gain capital and technology from FDI’s intervention.

The only political reforms implemented did not serve the goals of obliterating the existing political system but assist economic reforms. Political reforms within the Chinese Bureaucracy initiated by Deng such as extensive administrative and fiscal decentralization shifted formal authorities from the central government to lower-level governments. This led to a massive entry of new business entities supported by various governments in the form of collaboration between retired bureaucrats and the founding entrepreneur. This changed the ex-post behavior of bureaucrats, converting them from bribe takers to shareholders and the ex-tante behavior of bureaucrats (who wish to leap from government to business) to be more concerned about local economic growth in order to create more opportunities for local business to flourish. Such reforms within the Chinese Bureaucracy aided economic reforms while keeping the socialist party ideology intact.

The successes of the economic reforms experienced in China also places the socialist government in an advantageous position of exercising eudaemonic legitimacy- a mode of legitimacy where the regime justifies its rule by successful economic performance and provision of economic benefits to the individuals in society. In China’s case, this exchange of material gain for a conviction in the worthiness of the existing political order has preserved the Chinese Communist Policy and put a temporary halt to thoughts on political liberalization. For the long term, however, it is not only difficult to maintain economic success but also to distribute these gains evenly especially among the agrarian population that may generate new social demands and consequences, which will ultimately strain the regime’s governing capacity.

Anxiety Surrounding China's Growth

After reading The Elephant and the Dragon immediately one cannot help but feel anxious about the emerging economic powerhouse and world power that is China. The United States seems to be the only superpower at the moment, but this is going to change according to Robyn Meredith. She speaks extensively about China and India’s growth over the past few decades and why they are both potentially great powers (military, politically, economically). The argument is made that these nations’ growth will do nothing but good for the world--the world economy is growing, economic interdependence is preventing conflict, and regular Chinese people are increasing their individual wealth. However, the big concern, specifically with China was the lack of fundamental freedoms of the Chinese people and the growing differences in welfare between the rural and urban populace. The question that should be at the forefront of China’s growth is whether or not reform and democracy should be installed. Not many argue that China should never have democracy, but the answer many Chinese leaders give is that the nation is too large and there are too many problems to install a democracy or start major reforms, something that should be completely unacceptable to the international community.

Although Meredith draws the conclusion that India’s struggles to jumpstart their economy is due to their democracy, I believe that democracy and justice is more important. It seems as though the author tries to make some argument that a democratic China would not have been able to strengthen the economy to the degree at which it is under an autocratic system. However, one of the most telling stats given in the book was that can be a counterclaim to the argument presented is that Chinese GDP per capita has doubled in the cities from about $1000 to $2000. This might seem impressive that they are doubling GDP per capita, but this increase does nothing to shift Chinese welfare up in the ranks in the world. For example, the United States, the largest economy in the world, has a GDP per capita of $43,000. That is more than twenty fold the amount the average Chinese person makes. Of course China has the largest population in the world, but this does little to deter me from my convictions that the growth in the economy is large but it is used as a preventative measure against democracy. Although the days of Mao’s Cultural Revolution are over, Chinese people are not free in any large sense of the word. The lack of basic freedoms as that of speech or religion outlines the fundamental problems with the society. The common Indian is arguably better off than the common Chinese person because they have political and civil rights. What is the good to have increased money if you cannot do simple things like worship whichever god you wish?

Thus, the initial anxieties I had with the rise of China (especially) were lessened significantly. Many people in China are extremely unhappy because they are either completely neglected by the government when it comes to economic issues, while at the same time they are completely restrained when it comes to basic human rights. As China becomes more powerful, the international community has continued to take a harder look at China as a nation. Many see the tragedy of the common Chinese citizen as the fundamental reason for wishing to change Chinese society and its government. One also has to see the rocketing growth China has undergone has resulted in horrible environmental problems and has also forced millions away from land they were given under the revolution or, in some cases, have been working upon for generations. Whereas I completely see the merit in recognizing China’s rise to power, it must also be closely analyzed for the things that it is doing incorrectly. It is these growing pains which has created fetters on China, therefore not allowing the country to become a superpower on par with the United States in the near future.

Linkage of Economic and Political Reform

Based on the Chinese example, it is fairly clear that economic and political liberalization do not necessarily go hand in hand. It is the reason for this decoupling of political and economic liberalization that Mary Gallagher and to a lesser degree Robyn Meredith discuss in their respective works. In her "Reform and Openness," Gallagher attributed the lack of democratization to the effects of foreign direct investment on the Chinese economy. The massive influx of foreign direct investment (the only country receiving more FDI than China is the United States) blocked the creation of a domestic capitalist class and the privatization of state industries. This, and other effects of FDI, led to fragmentation of groups like the urban working class that stood to lose from increased economic liberalization. With no united opposition to its policies, the government did not face much widespread protest or even instability, making it much easier for the Chinese Communist Party to resist relinquishing any of its power.

According to Robyn Meredith, "China's government established a Singapore-style quid pro quo with the Chinese people: the Communist Party would allow economic freedom, but not political reform" (27). I think this is a good, if slightly simplified explanation of the economic liberalization without democratization currently occurring in China. With the incredible rapidity of development that has occurred over the past few decades, all the people of China have gained economically albeit some far more than others. With the authoritarian government run by the Communist Party able to deliver a better standard of living to everyone, the Chinese have little incentive to push for political reform. It is incredibly risky to stand up for reform in any government, but it could be lethal to stand up to the Chinese state, especially in light of what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989. When the economic situation is improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, what incentive do they have to organize an incredibly risky opposition movement? And, as Gallagher points out, the phenomenon of FDI has managed to split up the biggest potential opposition group, the urban working class.

One final explanation the lack of democratization in China is that China has never had any experience with democracy in the past. Before they were ruled by the iron fist of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese were ruled by local warlords and before that, by the dynastic emperors. The institution of representative democracy is completely foreign to China. This is not to say that China is incapable of having and sustaining a democratic government, it is just not a tendency arising from China's history and culture. While historical and cultural tendencies are obviously not obligatory for the creation of democracy, they do make its creation easier. While western nations has a middle class, strong civil society and fairly individualistic societies immediately prior to the development of their democracies, China has a history of very strong government, community-oriented values and, especially under communism, virtually no civil society. These factors certainly will not help China democratize.

The 2008 Olympics: Chinese Economic and Social Policies

At the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China's goal was to be the best. In the end, they came pretty close, winning the most gold medals of any country (51) and coming in second only to the U.S. in total medal count (110, 100). In class, we mentioned these Olympic games, but only to the extent of what China's hosting of a prestigious international event means for its national pride. Here, I plan to focus instead on what China's final medal count says about the nature of the Chinese political system. Ultimately, it seems that the policies China used to secure its 100 medals are essentially the same policies that China used to modernize its economy (discussed in the Ian Buruma and Mary Gallagher readings). In other words, the Olympics shows us that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pursues similar policies in economic arenas as it does in social arenas. Here are a few examples: 

First, since the era of Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued a policy of measured gaige kaifang, or "reform and openness" (Gallagher). In other words, China has slowly but surely turned toward a market-oriented economy by opening up the country to capitalism, and more specifically, to Foreign Direct Investment (Gallagher). China has thus modernized by diversifying the number of players in their economy from one (the state) to thousands (the state + private companies + foreign companies). This same phrase -- "reform and openness" -- applies equally well to the Chinese approach towards the Olympics. At the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona, China focused on the sports in which it had traditionally prospered (these are generally sports made easier by smaller statures). They won 16 gold medals but in only 7 sports. In 2008, China won gold medals in 19 sports. China's massive increase in gold medal count can be attributed to the fact that it diversified the sports for which it was a medal contender. They essentially reformed their system by moving away from traditional Chinese sports (table tennis, of course) and embracing some of the new Western forms of competitions (beach volleyball, for example). Thus, China's economic and social policies are quite similar in terms of reform and openness. 

  

Secondly, according to Buruma, the Chinese Communist Party places a major emphasis on "efficiency" in its economic system. China indeed thinks of individual liberties as secondary to state effectiveness and productivity, explicitly shown by the terrible working conditions -- long hours, minimal pay, child labor -- in many Chinese factories. This same emphasis on collective vs. individual flourishing played out in China's preparation for the 2008 Olympic games. You will remember that this past summer international news media broadcasted story after story of promising Chinese children who at the tender age of 5 were stripped from their families and placed in the equivalent of athletic boot camps. This is indeed the most efficient way of producing gold-medal athletes, but not necessarily the best for the children, their parents or their immediate communities. Thus, in China, efficiency trumps individual good in both the economy and cultural events. 

The fact that economic and cultural policies are quite similar should color some of our discussions about China and the Olympics. Ian Buruma, in his piece "What Beijing Can Learn From Moscow," argues that China's economic policies "lead us to believe that the one-party system is in itself a main source of instability" (Buruma 394). He does not really include any discussion on cultural/social policies. Since the CCP pursues economic and social policies in tandem, however, it is likely that updating the article to include social policies would strengthen rather than detract from his thesis. In other words, the policies that Beijing employed to get its coveted gold medals are likely the same policies that are possibly slowly but surely destabilizing the regime and country. 

China: Reform and Openness? (Or/and Coercive authoritarianism?)

On October 18, 2008, not surprisingly China lifted the restrictions on foreign journalists, which allows a foreign media to interview any Chinese nationals without government supervision. The decision carried out by the pro-capitalist communist authoritarian government, was a series of steps towards political liberalization in China followed by the financial liberalization, which has been a backbone of China’s economic boom since the late 1970’s. China unlike former Soviet Union and Central and East European countries did not collapse in the epidemic of democratization in early 1990’s. The pro-democratic movement of 1989 was forcefully destabilized by the Chinese government, though many scholars believe that the political liberalization has not been completely disabled in China. In light of the financial prosperity, industrialization, and the openness policy to “The West,” the political liberalization is taking place unanimously in the Chinese people as the government continues lifting bans and promoting rule of law.
In her article “Reform and Openness,” Mary Gallagher argues that economic reform and China’s close economic ties to the west reduced the immediate demand for political liberalization. Gallagher offers a thoroughly researched argument to show how the financial liberalization has played a resistant role in the political reform. One of the major economic effects is reflected in the foreign direct investment (FDI), by which China has been able to attract the largest amount of FDI of all developing countries in the world since 1979. On the one hand, foreign firms provided job opportunities to Chinese people, which created a competition among workers to accumulate more wealth from their labor. On the other hand, the government implemented a triangular competitive policy among the state owned businesses, private firms and the foreign companies, which created competition and more productivity, so the domestic and foreign business could benefit in many ways. In light of the economic reform, china has adapted a policy of flexible rules for business, property ownership and other civil rights that allow people to engage in economic competition, which leaves the need for political liberalization in shadow.
Gallagher also argues that the economic reform has internal and external causes to leave the political liberalization untouched. Internally, China has privatized many state owned corporations that are not productive, so that they could compete with the foreign owned businesses. Externally, China left its economic policy open and flexible to the external world, so foreign firms could easily enter China and benefit from the cheap labor. In both cases, the one party ruled authoritative government played a crucial role by maintaining a political stability and security for the business. Gallagher’s research is thoughtful and logical because she also provides a comparative analysis between China and the other East Asian countries South Korea, and Taiwan, which shows that the economic policy of the other East Asian countries’ was not enough to create same opportunities as China.
In her article, Gallagher gives too much credit for the facet of foreign direct investments to leave the political liberalization in the midst uncertainty. I personally think that giving too much credit for only the economic reform is unfair because what has happened to china is not only after the entry of FDI, but since Mao came in power in 1949, Chinese government imposed harsh and coercive power to destroy its oppositions and political aggression. The state setup military, party control government, censorship in media and human rights is also enough to force people mute against the political reform. It is also unfair to say that Gallagher’s arguments are weak; however, the historical setup of state and party institutions, aggressive party supervision in public life and the affective party leadership are also some responsible factors that can not be ignored and has destroyed the political liberalization in China.

Postcommunist Civil Society

Howard's discussion of the apparent weakness of postcommunist civil society, its causes, and its implications for the efficacy of young democracies in the postcommunist sphere is interesting, though somewhat noncommittal. Howard does a good job tying together the commonalities shared by old democracies, post authoritarian regimes, and post communist regimes and providing concrete data and historical reasons to back this up, but his conclusion is that basically, despite these proven differences, their role in determining the legacy of new democratic regimes will likely be minimal:

"I do not view postcommunist democracy as doomed to collapse or fail, nor do I believe that the weakness of civil society is a good sign for a healthy democracy. Instead, the weakness of civil society constitutes a distinctive element of post-communist democracy, a pattern that points to a qualitatively different relationship between citizens and the state..."

So what is this qualitatively different relationship and what does it mean? As mentioned in the articles, it is possible that weak civil society may result in unenthusiastic democracy, but at least it will be stable, because without the use of organizations to aggregate and pursue people's interests, the system should remain static. This does not mean that change cannot occur, however, and I believe the recent "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine is a good example of this.

The Orange Revolution occurred two years after this article was printed, and I believe demonstrates that, though citizens in postcommunist democracies may be actively involved in less social organizations, they still have the ability to band together when their interests are sufficiently threatened. This shows that, despite the fears that Putnam has about societies with little social capital not instilling the "skills" of democracy and participation in their people, that democracy can still be a vibrant and important part of people's lives. In some ways, the higher activity in labor unions in postcommunist regimes may have an important role to play in civil society, especially because labor unions are very effective at mobilizing interests and have effective tools at their disposal to do so (strikes, walk-offs, picketing, etc.). Compared to the role of a Church group or membership in Mensa or a bird-watching society, labor unions tend to be more active in the political and economic spheres of their members lives. So though I believe Howard's methodology is useful in looking at the types of civil society within different regime types, I think it may be lacking when applied directly to the health of democratic institutions.

The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society

In Howard’s study on the weakness of postcommunist civil society, he argues that a weak postcommunist civil society is an obstacle to consolidating democracy. There are many compelling reasons that he offers to explain this phenomena of weak civic skills in postcommunist countries. Mistrust of the former communist regime which repressed non-state activity and voluntary organizations and supplanted such activity by devising mandatory participation in state-controlled organizations is a main obstacle to developing civic skills and increasing political leverage among citizens. On the other hand, his argument of persistence of friendship networks appears as an overstatement where he gives the impression that citizens in postcommunist countries still live under the fear of trusting other members of the community and withdraw themselves from engaging socially with those that are outside of their private circles.

The negative impacts of weak civil society on the quality of democracy is associated with the arguments put forth by Robert Putnam who stresses that voluntary organizations “instill in their members habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well as practical skills to partake in public life”. A democracy that is not supported actively by the larger population is dysfunctional.
Another way in which a weak civil society hampers the consolidation of democracy is the minimal representation of their voices and views in the political-making process due to a fragmentation of opinions, interests and preferences.

Howard proposes two ways of solving the problem, although only one argument is relatively more convincing as it directly addresses the problem of the sentiments and attachments towards the peoples lifestyles and personal histories in the former regime. It would be implausible to “encourage postcommunist citizens to acquire familiarity, comfort and a new positive association with voluntary organizations” if this inherent resistance and prejudiced attitudes towards a new system remain. Therefore, the only viable solution would be to allow time and the mechanism of generational change to gradually develop this trend of letting go of communist ways and participating in voluntary organizations where a new generation and the following generations will become more embracing of such activities. This argument, however, may not hold true if ones’ parents, teachers and peers induce the same pattern of attitudes and behaviours that are passed on to the following generations despite the changed institutional setting.