(Nation) States and Societies

In Strong States and Weak Societies, Migdal makes a largely empirical argument for what he sees as the axis of Third-World development: the nexus between what are often newly formed governments, and the existing social structures over (and through) which they seek to exert their influence. He incorporates into this narrative a polemic against existing Development Theory - especially the "teliological" type - and instead proposes a different model for explaining and predicting state development, one predicated on historical levels and form of "social dislocation." Essentially, he posits, the more fragmented a country's society has become, the greater the tendency for power to be distributed away from central government, and into the hands of "strongmen" and other local authorities.

Yet, despite his extensive use of sociological arguments, Migdal loses sight of some key variables by ignoring the teliological perspective out-of-hand. In other words, by focusing so closely on the Third-World, he is able to identify differences and distinctions among the nations which comprise it; but his work would be better served (and, incidentally, constitute a better refutal of teliological hypotheses and Modernization Theory) if he also examined distinctions between those states and their First-World cousins. Instead, he concludes with what, by his own admission, is a bit of a truism - if not a tautological argument: "a society fragmented in social control...affects the state, which, in turn, reinforces the fragmentation of society."

This is a theory of government, not development - all societies were, at one time or another, "fragmented." Migdal provides an accurate diagnosis, but without contextual differentiation. The impetus for moving out of this state of fragmentation, according to Aristotle, Locke, and any number of thinkers, is human progress; thus, according to the former, humans will gradually aggregate into larger communities, and ultimately the state itself. This premise came to form the basis of Western thought, working itself out throught the Middle Ages and eventually coming to a head in the establishment of the Westphalian model (further solidified with the rise of liberal democracy).

No such philosophical foundation existed in much of the Third-World; many colonial states, with several exceptions, became "states" only by virtue of imperially drawn borders. They were not built upon popular recognition of the need to aggregate towards common progress, but instead established from the top-down. Social dislocation and fragmentation in modern states may be in part due to the "spread of the world economy" and all it brought with it; but even before that spread, most Latin American and African societies were far from anything we could today call a "nation-state." And while colonialism no doubt interrupted the process by which such states were formed in the West, this can hardly be compensated for in bypassing the median stages of development.

My argument, then, is this: Migdal's identification of social fragmentation, and its impact on the development of central state authority -and v.v.- is convincing (at least as far as I understand it). In limiting his examination to the Third-World, however, he overlooks the distinctions that may be drawn with other nations (and used to refute the teliological arguments he so despises). The process of aggregating citizens into states - especially democratic ones - relies on more than just the exercise of authority, in the ability to "penetrate, regulate, extract, and appropriate"; these powers must be complemented by, and indeed arise from, certain intangibles. Call it patriotism, nationalism, consent of the governed - these are the intangibles that bind fragmented populations together into body-politics, whence the true strength of government is derived.