To say the very least, Strong Societies and Weak States is not light reading. I’m not going to lie; in trudging through these 277 pages, I have only developed a perfunctory understanding of the intricacies of Migdal’s thesis. I don’t seriously believe any one of use can really figure what exactly what his model is and rationalize the various case studies that he has used to support his thesis.
In the most abbreviated encapsulation, this book seeks to examine why it is that a majority of Third World countries have been mired in what appears to be a constant process state disintegration following postcolonial nation building. By drawing heavily from the cases of Israel, Sierra Leone, and Egypt, and sampling liberally from countries such as Mexico, India, Nigeria, South Africa and others, Migdal develops a model centered on the relation between localized interests (power brokers, chieftains, etc.) and the state apparatus, and the struggle to define the policies of the nation-state in a way that leads to change in society as achieving greater prosperity, dignity, and equity.
In particular, I found the case studies of Israel and Sierra Leone to be particularly fascinating. Both countries were former British possessions, and were left in a state of intense fragmentation and general chaos following independence. Summarizing, it seems that an inflow of funds and resources in both countries created distinctly different results because they fell into different hands. In the case of Israel, Zionist labor leaders transferred funds into the Histradut and gave Ben-Gurion the necessary resources to unite Palestine under the Israeli flag. However, in Sierra Leone, British dismantling of traditional power arrangements and the haphazard transferring of resources to local chieftains created a society ripe for fragmentation. As such, over the course of the post-colonialism period, Sierra Leone has lacked a strong state apparatus because the national leaders have had to accommodate towards the demands of localized power brokers. This in turn has curtailed the effectiveness of the state to develop an effective bureaucracy barring some jarring social dislocation.
This I can deal with. I do have one question, however. In all the states analyzed, it seems that only Israel succeeded. What about cases such as China (you knew I would pick that)? Following the Second World War, it was not the inflow of resources from Japanese imperialists or Americans that created the climate for a strong state. In fact, for all the money that the U.S. dumped into the Nationalists, the Communists (who were comparatively underfunded by the Russians) still managed to prevail and create a strong state from a nation fragmented for over a hundred years.
All in all, I don’t disagree with Migdal’s thesis because quite frankly, I don’t understand it to the point of argument. However, I would have appreciated if he presented a couple more successful Third World models. Other than that, it’s definitely better than reading the toothpaste container in the bathroom.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Strength of the State
In Joel Migdal’s work Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World he discusses the reasons why most Third World countries have failed to become strong states. He expresses the importance of colonial backgrounds and influences from former parent countries. These states existed primarily to provide for the needs of the 18th and 19th parent states’ economies, thus their local financial and social well-being was not a crucial concern to imperialists thousands of miles away. How, then, can a state with such a background move forward to effectively govern its varied peoples?
The imperialists’ lack of foresight in most of the nations they occupied led to strong internal divisions, which have complicated and prevented much state development. They did not concern themselves with negotiating between local ethnic or tribal groups. These groups, they did not understand, are vital to the maintenance of state control beyond the key cities. As Migdal points out, “strong Third World societies, then, are not mere putty to be molded by states with sufficient technical resources, managerial abilities, and committed personnel” (36). Such a statement is proven not only in colonial society, but also in today’s world. When one considers the situation in Iraq, such a statement is especially true. A strong state, Midgal would contend, requires that its leaders understand and work with the various minority groups within its borders. He states that as Third World countries are noticeably more ethnically diverse than First World countries.
The best way for leaders to do so is to construct political agencies with the power to make large scale strategic choices affecting all of the separate groups in the country. These agencies would need to be far reaching and capable of understanding the multitude of interests in regions that may be far from the seat of government. Only through these can a government hope to simultaneously consolidate and expand its power to effectively maintain central social and political control.
Joel Migdal presents a fascinating, or at least engaging, investigation of the power relationship between states and the societies they supposedly govern. Beyond arguing for the central role thrust upon the developing state by the international community (more specifically the U.N. and the Bretton Woods organizations), Migdal emphatically stresses the importance and failure of the state in mobilizing the societies over which they preside. This abandonment of the traditional approaches to examining the problems of development presents a refreshing perspective to field that seems mired in somewhat static, institutionalized, if not outright crusty theories.
Although clearly eschewing the traditional theories of development (for which he into be credited), Migdal cannot help but to look toEurope for examples of successful states engaging their societies in a vein similar to that of the Modernitzationists. In fact, Migdal picks out three "tentacles" intrinsic to the early modern European state that allowed it to channel social behavior: strong standing armies, an established judicial system, and an efficient tax-collection apparatus. Migdal credits the failure of states to effectively develop themselves with the absence of these and/or innovative ways of engaging society and instead reverting to the "politics of survival".
Although clearly eschewing the traditional theories of development (for which he into be credited), Migdal cannot help but to look to
Although he supports his assertions with ample data, I feel that the state-side emphasis in approaching questions of development might be slightly limiting of our imagination, even if it is a fresh departure from other models. While Migdal certainly makes an excellent case for state engagement of societies, he overlooks the certain social movements and institutions that have developed outside the auspices of the state but still have proven beneficial in realizing the goals of development. Though they might be small and rather uncommon, small scale pooling of resources and entry into fair trade initiatives have proven very effective in raising the living standards of limited populations. Admittedly, for such social organizations to have any hope of truly flourishing, they must enjoy a secure environment and sufficiently maintained (much less present) infrastructure – ultimately responsibilities of the state. Thus, while Migdal correctly note the lack of state engagement, I would suggest a less antagonistic characterization of society in impeding the state’s ability to impose the rules that are to channel societal behavior; while empowerment of the state is a good a necessary component, we should be wary of overlooking the ingenuity of the people.
The necessary conditions for a strong state
In “Strong Societies and Weak Societies” Robert Migdal argues that for new states to form, there must be subversion of old methods and modes of survival (140). However, he also writes that there are certain other criteria that facilitate in the creation of a strong state. Two of these in particular are up for debate and discussion: the importance of an outside military threat and the world historical timing of the new state’s creation. These are valid points in some cases, but do not always hold up to the paradigm he establishes.
The role of a military threat in this process has proven important in many cases; however, it does not ensure state consolidation. An interesting case, or set of cases, upon which to test this idea is Africa. Very few African states fall into the category of a strong state. Many of these states have not faced a serious outside military threat because there is a lack of solid military forces in Africa on the whole. As a result, there is little incentive to take the risks towards state consolidation about which Migdal writes..
The other point up for discussion is the idea of the historical timing of the state change. This premise may very well hold true, but it is based on a good deal of assumptions. First, it assumes that ideas do have a causal quality and are influential in politics. This point has been up for debate for a long time in political discourse, and it is hard to take it for granted. Also, it is hard to posit that there are concentrated movements throughout history where these ideas have a stronghold on the world. Often there are movements of thinking, but it is a bit sweeping to claim that one ideologies becomes dominant in thinking.
Migdal opens an interesting discussion and makes many valid points about the relationship between societies and states. It is imperative to focus in, since his work deals with a multi-faceted issue.
The role of a military threat in this process has proven important in many cases; however, it does not ensure state consolidation. An interesting case, or set of cases, upon which to test this idea is Africa. Very few African states fall into the category of a strong state. Many of these states have not faced a serious outside military threat because there is a lack of solid military forces in Africa on the whole. As a result, there is little incentive to take the risks towards state consolidation about which Migdal writes..
The other point up for discussion is the idea of the historical timing of the state change. This premise may very well hold true, but it is based on a good deal of assumptions. First, it assumes that ideas do have a causal quality and are influential in politics. This point has been up for debate for a long time in political discourse, and it is hard to take it for granted. Also, it is hard to posit that there are concentrated movements throughout history where these ideas have a stronghold on the world. Often there are movements of thinking, but it is a bit sweeping to claim that one ideologies becomes dominant in thinking.
Migdal opens an interesting discussion and makes many valid points about the relationship between societies and states. It is imperative to focus in, since his work deals with a multi-faceted issue.
(Nation) States and Societies
In Strong States and Weak Societies, Migdal makes a largely empirical argument for what he sees as the axis of Third-World development: the nexus between what are often newly formed governments, and the existing social structures over (and through) which they seek to exert their influence. He incorporates into this narrative a polemic against existing Development Theory - especially the "teliological" type - and instead proposes a different model for explaining and predicting state development, one predicated on historical levels and form of "social dislocation." Essentially, he posits, the more fragmented a country's society has become, the greater the tendency for power to be distributed away from central government, and into the hands of "strongmen" and other local authorities.
Yet, despite his extensive use of sociological arguments, Migdal loses sight of some key variables by ignoring the teliological perspective out-of-hand. In other words, by focusing so closely on the Third-World, he is able to identify differences and distinctions among the nations which comprise it; but his work would be better served (and, incidentally, constitute a better refutal of teliological hypotheses and Modernization Theory) if he also examined distinctions between those states and their First-World cousins. Instead, he concludes with what, by his own admission, is a bit of a truism - if not a tautological argument: "a society fragmented in social control...affects the state, which, in turn, reinforces the fragmentation of society."
This is a theory of government, not development - all societies were, at one time or another, "fragmented." Migdal provides an accurate diagnosis, but without contextual differentiation. The impetus for moving out of this state of fragmentation, according to Aristotle, Locke, and any number of thinkers, is human progress; thus, according to the former, humans will gradually aggregate into larger communities, and ultimately the state itself. This premise came to form the basis of Western thought, working itself out throught the Middle Ages and eventually coming to a head in the establishment of the Westphalian model (further solidified with the rise of liberal democracy).
No such philosophical foundation existed in much of the Third-World; many colonial states, with several exceptions, became "states" only by virtue of imperially drawn borders. They were not built upon popular recognition of the need to aggregate towards common progress, but instead established from the top-down. Social dislocation and fragmentation in modern states may be in part due to the "spread of the world economy" and all it brought with it; but even before that spread, most Latin American and African societies were far from anything we could today call a "nation-state." And while colonialism no doubt interrupted the process by which such states were formed in the West, this can hardly be compensated for in bypassing the median stages of development.
My argument, then, is this: Migdal's identification of social fragmentation, and its impact on the development of central state authority -and v.v.- is convincing (at least as far as I understand it). In limiting his examination to the Third-World, however, he overlooks the distinctions that may be drawn with other nations (and used to refute the teliological arguments he so despises). The process of aggregating citizens into states - especially democratic ones - relies on more than just the exercise of authority, in the ability to "penetrate, regulate, extract, and appropriate"; these powers must be complemented by, and indeed arise from, certain intangibles. Call it patriotism, nationalism, consent of the governed - these are the intangibles that bind fragmented populations together into body-politics, whence the true strength of government is derived.
Yet, despite his extensive use of sociological arguments, Migdal loses sight of some key variables by ignoring the teliological perspective out-of-hand. In other words, by focusing so closely on the Third-World, he is able to identify differences and distinctions among the nations which comprise it; but his work would be better served (and, incidentally, constitute a better refutal of teliological hypotheses and Modernization Theory) if he also examined distinctions between those states and their First-World cousins. Instead, he concludes with what, by his own admission, is a bit of a truism - if not a tautological argument: "a society fragmented in social control...affects the state, which, in turn, reinforces the fragmentation of society."
This is a theory of government, not development - all societies were, at one time or another, "fragmented." Migdal provides an accurate diagnosis, but without contextual differentiation. The impetus for moving out of this state of fragmentation, according to Aristotle, Locke, and any number of thinkers, is human progress; thus, according to the former, humans will gradually aggregate into larger communities, and ultimately the state itself. This premise came to form the basis of Western thought, working itself out throught the Middle Ages and eventually coming to a head in the establishment of the Westphalian model (further solidified with the rise of liberal democracy).
No such philosophical foundation existed in much of the Third-World; many colonial states, with several exceptions, became "states" only by virtue of imperially drawn borders. They were not built upon popular recognition of the need to aggregate towards common progress, but instead established from the top-down. Social dislocation and fragmentation in modern states may be in part due to the "spread of the world economy" and all it brought with it; but even before that spread, most Latin American and African societies were far from anything we could today call a "nation-state." And while colonialism no doubt interrupted the process by which such states were formed in the West, this can hardly be compensated for in bypassing the median stages of development.
My argument, then, is this: Migdal's identification of social fragmentation, and its impact on the development of central state authority -and v.v.- is convincing (at least as far as I understand it). In limiting his examination to the Third-World, however, he overlooks the distinctions that may be drawn with other nations (and used to refute the teliological arguments he so despises). The process of aggregating citizens into states - especially democratic ones - relies on more than just the exercise of authority, in the ability to "penetrate, regulate, extract, and appropriate"; these powers must be complemented by, and indeed arise from, certain intangibles. Call it patriotism, nationalism, consent of the governed - these are the intangibles that bind fragmented populations together into body-politics, whence the true strength of government is derived.
Thursday, November 13, 2008
China From the Eyes of a Chinaman
For the uninitiated, The Elephant and the Dragon does a great job of introducing the key concepts surrounding the extraordinary rise of China and India in the last three decades. Key drivers in this economic modernization period, such as the development of a global supply chain in response to information technology linking faraway places in seconds and massive influx of direct foreign investment, are well explained and the repercussions of such developments covered in considerable detail. That being said, having been engaged in business with my family in China since I was a toddler and done considerable concentrated study on contemporary China policy, I feel that certain factors that Meredith attributes to China’s growth need reconsidering. One is the idea that there is an endless supply of cheap labor in the Chinese market.
Since I was five, my parents have been engaged in the “disassembly process” that Meredith details, working as not only a finisher of promotional goods, but also doing distribution here in the United States. T-shirts, duffel bags, backpacks, umbrellas; we do a little bit of everything. In the last five years, if there is one thing we have noticed, it is that labor costs have been increasing by an unbelievable amount annually. On the latest trip back this summer, my second uncle on my mother’s side (who runs the factory), lamented the fact that only a decade ago, workers would be lined up outside the factory seeking to find work. These days, laborers skilled with sewing machines are hard to come by, and small factories like ours that manage to bring some new workers in from Hunan and train them, will usually get them taken away by larger factories with better pay and amenities.
This by no means is a bad thing; China without a doubt needs this rise of standard in living as a country on the rise. However, Meredith tends to overemphasize the fact that cheap labor exists in China. Leninist country or not, the Chinese economy is subject to the same macro-effects of other markets, and the boom in production has led to what is looking to be an acute shortage of trained labor. I think part of this comes from the fact that Meredith is not an academic, but instead a journalist. Her aim is to drive home the fact that China and India are indeed booming, and in that sense she succeeds.
Delving further, I did a little independent research on the current state of investment within China. An interesting article I found in the China Briefing (http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2008/04/11/south-china-factories-on-the-move-%E2%80%93-relocation-has-begun.html), a newspaper dedicated to business in the country, had an interesting article about how South China (Guangdong and Fujian province), once the epicenter of cheap manufacturing (as described repeatedly by Meredith), has now seen a flight of factories away from the area, due to shortage of labor and increased governmental control. Just around our factory in Huadu, by a rough count this summer, I’ve seen about half of the factories close down, mostly those that specialize in secondary production (what we refer to in the industry as 加工 or added production). Having written a paper for this in my China Domestic Policies course with Professor Sutter, I’ve identified four causes for this downturn that really can be applied throughout China.
1. Decline in value-added tax refund- in the past, to encourage investment, the government would provide a rebate on a value added tax for goods domestically used in production. Each layer of production would get a VAT, and if the final good was being shipped out of the country, there would be a fat discount. However, in recent years, to curb inflation, the government cut down most of these rebates. In the recent stimulus package approved by the central government, these rebates are back, but it remains to be seen how much of a positive effect this is going to have in the medium and long term.
2. Appreciation of the yuan versus the dollar- around 2005, after increased pressure from the U.S. government, China finally began to de-peg it’s currency against the dollar. From a standard of about 8.3, we have now seen an increase in value of the RMB to 6.8. This has made Chinese goods much less competitive, and increased the costs of importing inputs from outside of the country (remember, it’s a GLOBAL supply chain).
3. Increased consumption of raw material inputs and the associated rise in costs- well, with so many factories working in China, particularly in fossil fuel related goods (nylon, phlalates or the things used to make rubber duckies and dildos soft) there has been a sharp jump in the costs of inputs. Another issue has been government regulations, which by seeking to damper the rising price of oil, flooded the market with subsidies. This had the effect of resulting in distortion in supply, increasing costs in the market for by-products.
4. Labor costs are going up!- as described before, labor costs are going up. Why? Well, there just seems to be a shortage of skilled workers. As Meredith describes, family workers have sent money home to families in impoverished villages. These amounts, though low by dollar standards, represent the combined income for whole families. Another factor has been the passage of new labor laws by the Chinese government. Ilooked at them this summer; they are confusing, contradictory, and while a step in the right direction, result in rising costs.
From my last point, I have one more quibble regarding Meredith’s book. In one section, she describes the daily wages of laborers in dollar amounts. The effect is that the unknowledgeable reader will voice shock at how low cruel, evil factory owners are paying exploited laborers. Unfortunately, what the fail to realize is that there is the buying power of one yuan in China is the equivalent of one dollar in the U.S., and Meredith’s wages when converted to yuan actually seem pretty reasonable. That $245 a month wage becomes almost 2000 RMB. While this might not be wealthy by any standards, it represents a considerable step up in earnings by workers. Give the market some time, and let China run it’s course. In my opinion, it is only a matter of time before China must begin it’s period of political liberalization. This is for it’s very own survival.
Since I was five, my parents have been engaged in the “disassembly process” that Meredith details, working as not only a finisher of promotional goods, but also doing distribution here in the United States. T-shirts, duffel bags, backpacks, umbrellas; we do a little bit of everything. In the last five years, if there is one thing we have noticed, it is that labor costs have been increasing by an unbelievable amount annually. On the latest trip back this summer, my second uncle on my mother’s side (who runs the factory), lamented the fact that only a decade ago, workers would be lined up outside the factory seeking to find work. These days, laborers skilled with sewing machines are hard to come by, and small factories like ours that manage to bring some new workers in from Hunan and train them, will usually get them taken away by larger factories with better pay and amenities.
This by no means is a bad thing; China without a doubt needs this rise of standard in living as a country on the rise. However, Meredith tends to overemphasize the fact that cheap labor exists in China. Leninist country or not, the Chinese economy is subject to the same macro-effects of other markets, and the boom in production has led to what is looking to be an acute shortage of trained labor. I think part of this comes from the fact that Meredith is not an academic, but instead a journalist. Her aim is to drive home the fact that China and India are indeed booming, and in that sense she succeeds.
Delving further, I did a little independent research on the current state of investment within China. An interesting article I found in the China Briefing (http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2008/04/11/south-china-factories-on-the-move-%E2%80%93-relocation-has-begun.html), a newspaper dedicated to business in the country, had an interesting article about how South China (Guangdong and Fujian province), once the epicenter of cheap manufacturing (as described repeatedly by Meredith), has now seen a flight of factories away from the area, due to shortage of labor and increased governmental control. Just around our factory in Huadu, by a rough count this summer, I’ve seen about half of the factories close down, mostly those that specialize in secondary production (what we refer to in the industry as 加工 or added production). Having written a paper for this in my China Domestic Policies course with Professor Sutter, I’ve identified four causes for this downturn that really can be applied throughout China.
1. Decline in value-added tax refund- in the past, to encourage investment, the government would provide a rebate on a value added tax for goods domestically used in production. Each layer of production would get a VAT, and if the final good was being shipped out of the country, there would be a fat discount. However, in recent years, to curb inflation, the government cut down most of these rebates. In the recent stimulus package approved by the central government, these rebates are back, but it remains to be seen how much of a positive effect this is going to have in the medium and long term.
2. Appreciation of the yuan versus the dollar- around 2005, after increased pressure from the U.S. government, China finally began to de-peg it’s currency against the dollar. From a standard of about 8.3, we have now seen an increase in value of the RMB to 6.8. This has made Chinese goods much less competitive, and increased the costs of importing inputs from outside of the country (remember, it’s a GLOBAL supply chain).
3. Increased consumption of raw material inputs and the associated rise in costs- well, with so many factories working in China, particularly in fossil fuel related goods (nylon, phlalates or the things used to make rubber duckies and dildos soft) there has been a sharp jump in the costs of inputs. Another issue has been government regulations, which by seeking to damper the rising price of oil, flooded the market with subsidies. This had the effect of resulting in distortion in supply, increasing costs in the market for by-products.
4. Labor costs are going up!- as described before, labor costs are going up. Why? Well, there just seems to be a shortage of skilled workers. As Meredith describes, family workers have sent money home to families in impoverished villages. These amounts, though low by dollar standards, represent the combined income for whole families. Another factor has been the passage of new labor laws by the Chinese government. Ilooked at them this summer; they are confusing, contradictory, and while a step in the right direction, result in rising costs.
From my last point, I have one more quibble regarding Meredith’s book. In one section, she describes the daily wages of laborers in dollar amounts. The effect is that the unknowledgeable reader will voice shock at how low cruel, evil factory owners are paying exploited laborers. Unfortunately, what the fail to realize is that there is the buying power of one yuan in China is the equivalent of one dollar in the U.S., and Meredith’s wages when converted to yuan actually seem pretty reasonable. That $245 a month wage becomes almost 2000 RMB. While this might not be wealthy by any standards, it represents a considerable step up in earnings by workers. Give the market some time, and let China run it’s course. In my opinion, it is only a matter of time before China must begin it’s period of political liberalization. This is for it’s very own survival.
Reform and Openess in China
In Gallagher’s study on China’s “reform and openness”, we see the great degree to which economic reforms and political liberalization are not necessarily linked. China’s political reforms essentially attempt to facilitate economic development and not democratization. They serve to improve the efficiency of the existing political system and not obliterate it. With a history of devastating wars and chaotic revolutions, it is not surprising that we see China take on a gradual, experimental and accumulative approach rather than employ the shock therapy approach and suffer its paralyzing effects.
FDI liberalization has been employed as a pivotal tool to unleash competitive pressures and allow ideological reformulation. The former minimizes the ability of affected groups to mobilize themselves as a credible counter-force while the latter transforms the debate between public and private industries to one that concerned the nationalistic need to strengthen a Chinese industry to confront foreign competition. By doing so, the Chinese regime retains its legitimacy through “shielding itself from accusations that it has sold out socialism”, justifying that drastic political reforms such as a transition to democracy is not necessary. In the realm of the economy, the debate on socialism and capitalism is clearly not an issue for economic development.
FDI liberalization has demonstrated itself to be less politically destabilizing to a reforming socialist regime in China’s case because it did not directly challenge the most recalcitrant interest groups under socialism. It instead led to the gradual corroding of resistance among competing firms on the regional and local level and even among state enterprises which experience losing out on the chance to gain capital and technology from FDI’s intervention.
The only political reforms implemented did not serve the goals of obliterating the existing political system but assist economic reforms. Political reforms within the Chinese Bureaucracy initiated by Deng such as extensive administrative and fiscal decentralization shifted formal authorities from the central government to lower-level governments. This led to a massive entry of new business entities supported by various governments in the form of collaboration between retired bureaucrats and the founding entrepreneur. This changed the ex-post behavior of bureaucrats, converting them from bribe takers to shareholders and the ex-tante behavior of bureaucrats (who wish to leap from government to business) to be more concerned about local economic growth in order to create more opportunities for local business to flourish. Such reforms within the Chinese Bureaucracy aided economic reforms while keeping the socialist party ideology intact.
The successes of the economic reforms experienced in China also places the socialist government in an advantageous position of exercising eudaemonic legitimacy- a mode of legitimacy where the regime justifies its rule by successful economic performance and provision of economic benefits to the individuals in society. In China’s case, this exchange of material gain for a conviction in the worthiness of the existing political order has preserved the Chinese Communist Policy and put a temporary halt to thoughts on political liberalization. For the long term, however, it is not only difficult to maintain economic success but also to distribute these gains evenly especially among the agrarian population that may generate new social demands and consequences, which will ultimately strain the regime’s governing capacity.
Anxiety Surrounding China's Growth
After reading The Elephant and the Dragon immediately one cannot help but feel anxious about the emerging economic powerhouse and world power that is China. The United States seems to be the only superpower at the moment, but this is going to change according to Robyn Meredith. She speaks extensively about China and India’s growth over the past few decades and why they are both potentially great powers (military, politically, economically). The argument is made that these nations’ growth will do nothing but good for the world--the world economy is growing, economic interdependence is preventing conflict, and regular Chinese people are increasing their individual wealth. However, the big concern, specifically with China was the lack of fundamental freedoms of the Chinese people and the growing differences in welfare between the rural and urban populace. The question that should be at the forefront of China’s growth is whether or not reform and democracy should be installed. Not many argue that China should never have democracy, but the answer many Chinese leaders give is that the nation is too large and there are too many problems to install a democracy or start major reforms, something that should be completely unacceptable to the international community.
Although Meredith draws the conclusion that India’s struggles to jumpstart their economy is due to their democracy, I believe that democracy and justice is more important. It seems as though the author tries to make some argument that a democratic China would not have been able to strengthen the economy to the degree at which it is under an autocratic system. However, one of the most telling stats given in the book was that can be a counterclaim to the argument presented is that Chinese GDP per capita has doubled in the cities from about $1000 to $2000. This might seem impressive that they are doubling GDP per capita, but this increase does nothing to shift Chinese welfare up in the ranks in the world. For example, the United States, the largest economy in the world, has a GDP per capita of $43,000. That is more than twenty fold the amount the average Chinese person makes. Of course China has the largest population in the world, but this does little to deter me from my convictions that the growth in the economy is large but it is used as a preventative measure against democracy. Although the days of Mao’s Cultural Revolution are over, Chinese people are not free in any large sense of the word. The lack of basic freedoms as that of speech or religion outlines the fundamental problems with the society. The common Indian is arguably better off than the common Chinese person because they have political and civil rights. What is the good to have increased money if you cannot do simple things like worship whichever god you wish?
Thus, the initial anxieties I had with the rise of China (especially) were lessened significantly. Many people in China are extremely unhappy because they are either completely neglected by the government when it comes to economic issues, while at the same time they are completely restrained when it comes to basic human rights. As China becomes more powerful, the international community has continued to take a harder look at China as a nation. Many see the tragedy of the common Chinese citizen as the fundamental reason for wishing to change Chinese society and its government. One also has to see the rocketing growth China has undergone has resulted in horrible environmental problems and has also forced millions away from land they were given under the revolution or, in some cases, have been working upon for generations. Whereas I completely see the merit in recognizing China’s rise to power, it must also be closely analyzed for the things that it is doing incorrectly. It is these growing pains which has created fetters on China, therefore not allowing the country to become a superpower on par with the United States in the near future.
Linkage of Economic and Political Reform
Based on the Chinese example, it is fairly clear that economic and political liberalization do not necessarily go hand in hand. It is the reason for this decoupling of political and economic liberalization that Mary Gallagher and to a lesser degree Robyn Meredith discuss in their respective works. In her "Reform and Openness," Gallagher attributed the lack of democratization to the effects of foreign direct investment on the Chinese economy. The massive influx of foreign direct investment (the only country receiving more FDI than China is the United States) blocked the creation of a domestic capitalist class and the privatization of state industries. This, and other effects of FDI, led to fragmentation of groups like the urban working class that stood to lose from increased economic liberalization. With no united opposition to its policies, the government did not face much widespread protest or even instability, making it much easier for the Chinese Communist Party to resist relinquishing any of its power.
According to Robyn Meredith, "China's government established a Singapore-style quid pro quo with the Chinese people: the Communist Party would allow economic freedom, but not political reform" (27). I think this is a good, if slightly simplified explanation of the economic liberalization without democratization currently occurring in China. With the incredible rapidity of development that has occurred over the past few decades, all the people of China have gained economically albeit some far more than others. With the authoritarian government run by the Communist Party able to deliver a better standard of living to everyone, the Chinese have little incentive to push for political reform. It is incredibly risky to stand up for reform in any government, but it could be lethal to stand up to the Chinese state, especially in light of what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989. When the economic situation is improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, what incentive do they have to organize an incredibly risky opposition movement? And, as Gallagher points out, the phenomenon of FDI has managed to split up the biggest potential opposition group, the urban working class.
One final explanation the lack of democratization in China is that China has never had any experience with democracy in the past. Before they were ruled by the iron fist of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese were ruled by local warlords and before that, by the dynastic emperors. The institution of representative democracy is completely foreign to China. This is not to say that China is incapable of having and sustaining a democratic government, it is just not a tendency arising from China's history and culture. While historical and cultural tendencies are obviously not obligatory for the creation of democracy, they do make its creation easier. While western nations has a middle class, strong civil society and fairly individualistic societies immediately prior to the development of their democracies, China has a history of very strong government, community-oriented values and, especially under communism, virtually no civil society. These factors certainly will not help China democratize.
According to Robyn Meredith, "China's government established a Singapore-style quid pro quo with the Chinese people: the Communist Party would allow economic freedom, but not political reform" (27). I think this is a good, if slightly simplified explanation of the economic liberalization without democratization currently occurring in China. With the incredible rapidity of development that has occurred over the past few decades, all the people of China have gained economically albeit some far more than others. With the authoritarian government run by the Communist Party able to deliver a better standard of living to everyone, the Chinese have little incentive to push for political reform. It is incredibly risky to stand up for reform in any government, but it could be lethal to stand up to the Chinese state, especially in light of what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989. When the economic situation is improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, what incentive do they have to organize an incredibly risky opposition movement? And, as Gallagher points out, the phenomenon of FDI has managed to split up the biggest potential opposition group, the urban working class.
One final explanation the lack of democratization in China is that China has never had any experience with democracy in the past. Before they were ruled by the iron fist of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese were ruled by local warlords and before that, by the dynastic emperors. The institution of representative democracy is completely foreign to China. This is not to say that China is incapable of having and sustaining a democratic government, it is just not a tendency arising from China's history and culture. While historical and cultural tendencies are obviously not obligatory for the creation of democracy, they do make its creation easier. While western nations has a middle class, strong civil society and fairly individualistic societies immediately prior to the development of their democracies, China has a history of very strong government, community-oriented values and, especially under communism, virtually no civil society. These factors certainly will not help China democratize.
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
The 2008 Olympics: Chinese Economic and Social Policies
At the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China's goal was to be the best. In the end, they came pretty close, winning the most gold medals of any country (51) and coming in second only to the U.S. in total medal count (110, 100). In class, we mentioned these Olympic games, but only to the extent of what China's hosting of a prestigious international event means for its national pride. Here, I plan to focus instead on what China's final medal count says about the nature of the Chinese political system. Ultimately, it seems that the policies China used to secure its 100 medals are essentially the same policies that China used to modernize its economy (discussed in the Ian Buruma and Mary Gallagher readings). In other words, the Olympics shows us that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pursues similar policies in economic arenas as it does in social arenas. Here are a few examples:
First, since the era of Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued a policy of measured gaige kaifang, or "reform and openness" (Gallagher). In other words, China has slowly but surely turned toward a market-oriented economy by opening up the country to capitalism, and more specifically, to Foreign Direct Investment (Gallagher). China has thus modernized by diversifying the number of players in their economy from one (the state) to thousands (the state + private companies + foreign companies). This same phrase -- "reform and openness" -- applies equally well to the Chinese approach towards the Olympics. At the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona, China focused on the sports in which it had traditionally prospered (these are generally sports made easier by smaller statures). They won 16 gold medals but in only 7 sports. In 2008, China won gold medals in 19 sports. China's massive increase in gold medal count can be attributed to the fact that it diversified the sports for which it was a medal contender. They essentially reformed their system by moving away from traditional Chinese sports (table tennis, of course) and embracing some of the new Western forms of competitions (beach volleyball, for example). Thus, China's economic and social policies are quite similar in terms of reform and openness.
Secondly, according to Buruma, the Chinese Communist Party places a major emphasis on "efficiency" in its economic system. China indeed thinks of individual liberties as secondary to state effectiveness and productivity, explicitly shown by the terrible working conditions -- long hours, minimal pay, child labor -- in many Chinese factories. This same emphasis on collective vs. individual flourishing played out in China's preparation for the 2008 Olympic games. You will remember that this past summer international news media broadcasted story after story of promising Chinese children who at the tender age of 5 were stripped from their families and placed in the equivalent of athletic boot camps. This is indeed the most efficient way of producing gold-medal athletes, but not necessarily the best for the children, their parents or their immediate communities. Thus, in China, efficiency trumps individual good in both the economy and cultural events.
The fact that economic and cultural policies are quite similar should color some of our discussions about China and the Olympics. Ian Buruma, in his piece "What Beijing Can Learn From Moscow," argues that China's economic policies "lead us to believe that the one-party system is in itself a main source of instability" (Buruma 394). He does not really include any discussion on cultural/social policies. Since the CCP pursues economic and social policies in tandem, however, it is likely that updating the article to include social policies would strengthen rather than detract from his thesis. In other words, the policies that Beijing employed to get its coveted gold medals are likely the same policies that are possibly slowly but surely destabilizing the regime and country.
China: Reform and Openness? (Or/and Coercive authoritarianism?)
On October 18, 2008, not surprisingly China lifted the restrictions on foreign journalists, which allows a foreign media to interview any Chinese nationals without government supervision. The decision carried out by the pro-capitalist communist authoritarian government, was a series of steps towards political liberalization in China followed by the financial liberalization, which has been a backbone of China’s economic boom since the late 1970’s. China unlike former Soviet Union and Central and East European countries did not collapse in the epidemic of democratization in early 1990’s. The pro-democratic movement of 1989 was forcefully destabilized by the Chinese government, though many scholars believe that the political liberalization has not been completely disabled in China. In light of the financial prosperity, industrialization, and the openness policy to “The West,” the political liberalization is taking place unanimously in the Chinese people as the government continues lifting bans and promoting rule of law.
In her article “Reform and Openness,” Mary Gallagher argues that economic reform and China’s close economic ties to the west reduced the immediate demand for political liberalization. Gallagher offers a thoroughly researched argument to show how the financial liberalization has played a resistant role in the political reform. One of the major economic effects is reflected in the foreign direct investment (FDI), by which China has been able to attract the largest amount of FDI of all developing countries in the world since 1979. On the one hand, foreign firms provided job opportunities to Chinese people, which created a competition among workers to accumulate more wealth from their labor. On the other hand, the government implemented a triangular competitive policy among the state owned businesses, private firms and the foreign companies, which created competition and more productivity, so the domestic and foreign business could benefit in many ways. In light of the economic reform, china has adapted a policy of flexible rules for business, property ownership and other civil rights that allow people to engage in economic competition, which leaves the need for political liberalization in shadow.
Gallagher also argues that the economic reform has internal and external causes to leave the political liberalization untouched. Internally, China has privatized many state owned corporations that are not productive, so that they could compete with the foreign owned businesses. Externally, China left its economic policy open and flexible to the external world, so foreign firms could easily enter China and benefit from the cheap labor. In both cases, the one party ruled authoritative government played a crucial role by maintaining a political stability and security for the business. Gallagher’s research is thoughtful and logical because she also provides a comparative analysis between China and the other East Asian countries South Korea, and Taiwan, which shows that the economic policy of the other East Asian countries’ was not enough to create same opportunities as China.
In her article, Gallagher gives too much credit for the facet of foreign direct investments to leave the political liberalization in the midst uncertainty. I personally think that giving too much credit for only the economic reform is unfair because what has happened to china is not only after the entry of FDI, but since Mao came in power in 1949, Chinese government imposed harsh and coercive power to destroy its oppositions and political aggression. The state setup military, party control government, censorship in media and human rights is also enough to force people mute against the political reform. It is also unfair to say that Gallagher’s arguments are weak; however, the historical setup of state and party institutions, aggressive party supervision in public life and the affective party leadership are also some responsible factors that can not be ignored and has destroyed the political liberalization in China.
In her article “Reform and Openness,” Mary Gallagher argues that economic reform and China’s close economic ties to the west reduced the immediate demand for political liberalization. Gallagher offers a thoroughly researched argument to show how the financial liberalization has played a resistant role in the political reform. One of the major economic effects is reflected in the foreign direct investment (FDI), by which China has been able to attract the largest amount of FDI of all developing countries in the world since 1979. On the one hand, foreign firms provided job opportunities to Chinese people, which created a competition among workers to accumulate more wealth from their labor. On the other hand, the government implemented a triangular competitive policy among the state owned businesses, private firms and the foreign companies, which created competition and more productivity, so the domestic and foreign business could benefit in many ways. In light of the economic reform, china has adapted a policy of flexible rules for business, property ownership and other civil rights that allow people to engage in economic competition, which leaves the need for political liberalization in shadow.
Gallagher also argues that the economic reform has internal and external causes to leave the political liberalization untouched. Internally, China has privatized many state owned corporations that are not productive, so that they could compete with the foreign owned businesses. Externally, China left its economic policy open and flexible to the external world, so foreign firms could easily enter China and benefit from the cheap labor. In both cases, the one party ruled authoritative government played a crucial role by maintaining a political stability and security for the business. Gallagher’s research is thoughtful and logical because she also provides a comparative analysis between China and the other East Asian countries South Korea, and Taiwan, which shows that the economic policy of the other East Asian countries’ was not enough to create same opportunities as China.
In her article, Gallagher gives too much credit for the facet of foreign direct investments to leave the political liberalization in the midst uncertainty. I personally think that giving too much credit for only the economic reform is unfair because what has happened to china is not only after the entry of FDI, but since Mao came in power in 1949, Chinese government imposed harsh and coercive power to destroy its oppositions and political aggression. The state setup military, party control government, censorship in media and human rights is also enough to force people mute against the political reform. It is also unfair to say that Gallagher’s arguments are weak; however, the historical setup of state and party institutions, aggressive party supervision in public life and the affective party leadership are also some responsible factors that can not be ignored and has destroyed the political liberalization in China.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Postcommunist Civil Society
Howard's discussion of the apparent weakness of postcommunist civil society, its causes, and its implications for the efficacy of young democracies in the postcommunist sphere is interesting, though somewhat noncommittal. Howard does a good job tying together the commonalities shared by old democracies, post authoritarian regimes, and post communist regimes and providing concrete data and historical reasons to back this up, but his conclusion is that basically, despite these proven differences, their role in determining the legacy of new democratic regimes will likely be minimal:
"I do not view postcommunist democracy as doomed to collapse or fail, nor do I believe that the weakness of civil society is a good sign for a healthy democracy. Instead, the weakness of civil society constitutes a distinctive element of post-communist democracy, a pattern that points to a qualitatively different relationship between citizens and the state..."
So what is this qualitatively different relationship and what does it mean? As mentioned in the articles, it is possible that weak civil society may result in unenthusiastic democracy, but at least it will be stable, because without the use of organizations to aggregate and pursue people's interests, the system should remain static. This does not mean that change cannot occur, however, and I believe the recent "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine is a good example of this.
The Orange Revolution occurred two years after this article was printed, and I believe demonstrates that, though citizens in postcommunist democracies may be actively involved in less social organizations, they still have the ability to band together when their interests are sufficiently threatened. This shows that, despite the fears that Putnam has about societies with little social capital not instilling the "skills" of democracy and participation in their people, that democracy can still be a vibrant and important part of people's lives. In some ways, the higher activity in labor unions in postcommunist regimes may have an important role to play in civil society, especially because labor unions are very effective at mobilizing interests and have effective tools at their disposal to do so (strikes, walk-offs, picketing, etc.). Compared to the role of a Church group or membership in Mensa or a bird-watching society, labor unions tend to be more active in the political and economic spheres of their members lives. So though I believe Howard's methodology is useful in looking at the types of civil society within different regime types, I think it may be lacking when applied directly to the health of democratic institutions.
The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society
In Howard’s study on the weakness of postcommunist civil society, he argues that a weak postcommunist civil society is an obstacle to consolidating democracy. There are many compelling reasons that he offers to explain this phenomena of weak civic skills in postcommunist countries. Mistrust of the former communist regime which repressed non-state activity and voluntary organizations and supplanted such activity by devising mandatory participation in state-controlled organizations is a main obstacle to developing civic skills and increasing political leverage among citizens. On the other hand, his argument of persistence of friendship networks appears as an overstatement where he gives the impression that citizens in postcommunist countries still live under the fear of trusting other members of the community and withdraw themselves from engaging socially with those that are outside of their private circles.
The negative impacts of weak civil society on the quality of democracy is associated with the arguments put forth by Robert Putnam who stresses that voluntary organizations “instill in their members habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, as well as practical skills to partake in public life”. A democracy that is not supported actively by the larger population is dysfunctional.
Another way in which a weak civil society hampers the consolidation of democracy is the minimal representation of their voices and views in the political-making process due to a fragmentation of opinions, interests and preferences.
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
An interesting, but flawed study of social organization
Marc Howard’s discussion of civil society in post communist states makes some solid conclusions about the reasons for and consequences of a lack of social organization in these states. However, his argument is a bit too presumptive and contains flaws.
The evidence obviously supports that the level of organizational membership is lower in the post communist states than in others (159). After presenting this evidence, Howard makes three conjectures as to why there is such little organization. His second of these hypotheses, that close friendships remain strong, is vague and not very telling. Frankly, in most surveys, be it the Afrobarometer or World Values Survey, most respondents tend to be more trustful the more specific the social group is. In other words, people are always more likely to trust their neighbor than they are to trust the government. Howard claims that these networks are a result “of the high politicization of the public sphere” (162). Such an argument makes too many assumptions. It is not fair to assume that this paradigm is specific to post communist states, when really it is quite general.
Howard’s article then discusses the implications of these findings on the prospects for democracy in these states. He is reluctant to discuss the consequences on post-communist states: “…I do not view post communist democracy as doomed to collapse or fail, nor do I believe that the weakness of civil society is a good sign for a healthy democracy” (164). Howard is too passive in this section. This lack of civil society does have a real effect on the success of democracy in many states. Additionally, Howard’s reason for thinking that the lack of organization will not cause democracy to fail is sweeping and not really falsifiable: he thinks that people will also fail to organize against the government (164). This hypothesis may be true, but it is tough to ever test it. How can one ever falsify such an idea? The correlation is not likely.
This lack of social organization is an important issue and deserves a great deal of study. Howard does a good job of analyzing the data, but he makes some conclusions that are questionable.
The evidence obviously supports that the level of organizational membership is lower in the post communist states than in others (159). After presenting this evidence, Howard makes three conjectures as to why there is such little organization. His second of these hypotheses, that close friendships remain strong, is vague and not very telling. Frankly, in most surveys, be it the Afrobarometer or World Values Survey, most respondents tend to be more trustful the more specific the social group is. In other words, people are always more likely to trust their neighbor than they are to trust the government. Howard claims that these networks are a result “of the high politicization of the public sphere” (162). Such an argument makes too many assumptions. It is not fair to assume that this paradigm is specific to post communist states, when really it is quite general.
Howard’s article then discusses the implications of these findings on the prospects for democracy in these states. He is reluctant to discuss the consequences on post-communist states: “…I do not view post communist democracy as doomed to collapse or fail, nor do I believe that the weakness of civil society is a good sign for a healthy democracy” (164). Howard is too passive in this section. This lack of civil society does have a real effect on the success of democracy in many states. Additionally, Howard’s reason for thinking that the lack of organization will not cause democracy to fail is sweeping and not really falsifiable: he thinks that people will also fail to organize against the government (164). This hypothesis may be true, but it is tough to ever test it. How can one ever falsify such an idea? The correlation is not likely.
This lack of social organization is an important issue and deserves a great deal of study. Howard does a good job of analyzing the data, but he makes some conclusions that are questionable.
Postcommunist Civil Society
Howard’s article about postcommunist civil societies articulates the ways in which having a weak civil society, which is the case for postcommunist countries, affects democracy. Howard accepts the fact that, “the weakness of civil society constitutes a distinctive element of post-communist democracy”, as well as the fact that this weakness in civil society “has a negative impact on the quality of postcommunist democracy”(164). This is all very important, as well as being true, and Howard credits the idea that a strong civil society leads to a stronger democracy to Robert Putnam. So having established that these postcommunist countries have a problem in the weakness of their civil societies Howard then offers two ways in which this problem can be resolved: generational change and encouragement. The first of these two solutions is, as Howard admits, much more likely to be the way in which change occurs.
Generational change would help to improve civil society because one of the main reasons that Howard proposes as the cause of the weak civil societies is the memory of the communist programs that they were forced to participate in, and often caused them great distress, but after a new generation, who did not experience these horrors, takes over then there would be no memory of these programs to keep them from getting involved in civil society. This is ultimately the most likely way in which this change will occur. Howard does offer one potential criticism to this source of change. He says that because socialization comes from more than simply memories, it comes from family and stories and friends, it is possible that this fear of organizations may transfer from generation to generation (166). I find this to be an unlikely scenario; although what socialization does come from many sources, it is very unlikely that fear will have a 100% generational transfer. Meaning that slowly but surely these fears will be so distant from the real lives of new generations that they will not be able to relate to them, and thus civil society will grow and flourish.
Keenan Conrad
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