The 2008 Olympics: Chinese Economic and Social Policies

At the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China's goal was to be the best. In the end, they came pretty close, winning the most gold medals of any country (51) and coming in second only to the U.S. in total medal count (110, 100). In class, we mentioned these Olympic games, but only to the extent of what China's hosting of a prestigious international event means for its national pride. Here, I plan to focus instead on what China's final medal count says about the nature of the Chinese political system. Ultimately, it seems that the policies China used to secure its 100 medals are essentially the same policies that China used to modernize its economy (discussed in the Ian Buruma and Mary Gallagher readings). In other words, the Olympics shows us that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pursues similar policies in economic arenas as it does in social arenas. Here are a few examples: 

First, since the era of Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued a policy of measured gaige kaifang, or "reform and openness" (Gallagher). In other words, China has slowly but surely turned toward a market-oriented economy by opening up the country to capitalism, and more specifically, to Foreign Direct Investment (Gallagher). China has thus modernized by diversifying the number of players in their economy from one (the state) to thousands (the state + private companies + foreign companies). This same phrase -- "reform and openness" -- applies equally well to the Chinese approach towards the Olympics. At the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona, China focused on the sports in which it had traditionally prospered (these are generally sports made easier by smaller statures). They won 16 gold medals but in only 7 sports. In 2008, China won gold medals in 19 sports. China's massive increase in gold medal count can be attributed to the fact that it diversified the sports for which it was a medal contender. They essentially reformed their system by moving away from traditional Chinese sports (table tennis, of course) and embracing some of the new Western forms of competitions (beach volleyball, for example). Thus, China's economic and social policies are quite similar in terms of reform and openness. 

  

Secondly, according to Buruma, the Chinese Communist Party places a major emphasis on "efficiency" in its economic system. China indeed thinks of individual liberties as secondary to state effectiveness and productivity, explicitly shown by the terrible working conditions -- long hours, minimal pay, child labor -- in many Chinese factories. This same emphasis on collective vs. individual flourishing played out in China's preparation for the 2008 Olympic games. You will remember that this past summer international news media broadcasted story after story of promising Chinese children who at the tender age of 5 were stripped from their families and placed in the equivalent of athletic boot camps. This is indeed the most efficient way of producing gold-medal athletes, but not necessarily the best for the children, their parents or their immediate communities. Thus, in China, efficiency trumps individual good in both the economy and cultural events. 

The fact that economic and cultural policies are quite similar should color some of our discussions about China and the Olympics. Ian Buruma, in his piece "What Beijing Can Learn From Moscow," argues that China's economic policies "lead us to believe that the one-party system is in itself a main source of instability" (Buruma 394). He does not really include any discussion on cultural/social policies. Since the CCP pursues economic and social policies in tandem, however, it is likely that updating the article to include social policies would strengthen rather than detract from his thesis. In other words, the policies that Beijing employed to get its coveted gold medals are likely the same policies that are possibly slowly but surely destabilizing the regime and country.