EU Successful on Economic Front; Not so much with Foreign Policy

The economic benefits of the European Union have been indisputable. Economic integration, including “removing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, money and people,” has given Europe substantial growth (European Union website- www.europa.eu). As Judt puts it, even the “most ardent British Euroskeptics” have conceded to the real economic benefits of the EU (732). The relatively recent freedom to travel, work, or study anywhere in the EU has been a huge success.
In contrast, foreign and security policy is an area that is much less developed than economic policy. As mentioned in lecture, the coordination of foreign policy has been difficult. Because the EU is not a state, citizens are first and foremost concerned with their national security than with security policy of Europe as a whole. And rightly so- citizens are loyal to the country in which they live, whose taxes they pay, and whose language they speak. The EU has a harder time defining and enforcing its own security interests.
As Brendan said, only time can tell if Europeans will identify themselves first as Europeans. If the institution of the EU can help promote European unity beyond the fiscal realm, perhaps coordinated foreign and security policy is not far behind.

The United Kingdom and the European Union: Natural Allies (Tony Wright: British Politics)

Before reading Tony Wright's "British Politics: A Very Short Introduction," I operated under an important misconception: I assumed that the United Kingdom as proved reluctant to fully embrace the project of the European Union because its values are inherently different from those espoused by the EU. It is an easy mistake to make, seeing as the British system emphasizes strong national government, while the EU requires national government to become subordinate to international law and norms. However, by examining the description of British politics in the Wright book, I have come to understand that the two systems are only superficially different. The core ideas about politics that underlie the political systems of the EU and the UK are remarkably similar:

The European Union, as Professor King discussed at length, is composed of two types of agencies: intergovernmental institutions and supranational institutions. The members of intergovernmental agencies such as the European Council and, to some extent, the European Parliament are required to represent the interests of their respective nations. Within a supranational institution like the European Commission (and perhaps the Parliament), however, representatives must promote the general welfare of Europe, not the interests of the states that elected them. 

The political system of the United Kingdom has the equivalent of intergovernmental and supranational institutions on a a national level. The prime minister, for example, is expected to act as a one-man supranational institution. Though elected by single constituency with specific interests, the prime minister must place general welfare about the interests of the citizens who directly pt him in office. The remainder of of Parliament, however, acts as the equivalent t an intergovernmental agency. The MEPs must respond directly to the needs and interests of their respective constituencies. (Granted, the argument has been made that parliamentarians act more in line with the part platform than with the interests of their voting blocks. This argument does not hold up to empirical evidence; Wright points out that it is "patently obvious" that parties are "racked by internal divisions." Thus, parliamentarians do in fact break with party lines on behalf of their constituents). 

Therefore, citizens in pre-EU United Kingdom and in the European Union experience remarkably similar forms of representation: they can both boast two layers of representation (one in the form of intergovernmental actors and the other in the form of supranational actors). Thus, the EU and the UK agree that political systems should include two layers of representation with differing objectives. 

The agreement on representation points to an even deeper shared value regarding the role of government in society. In the United States, we do not have an institutionalized supranational form of government. Supreme Court justices are perhaps the group most removed from individual constituencies and yet they remain largely defined by partisan politics. Thus, the fact that Britain and the EU require two layers of representation suggests that both political systems place an extremely high value on the welfare of the citizens. Moreover, they see it as the government's role to sustain individual citizens. This is in direct opposition to the "pull yourself up by your own bootstraps" mentality of the United States. Thus, the Eu and the UK are natural ideological allies and full integration of Britain into the European Union should not come at as high of a cost to traditional Britain as I once thought. 

The Great Nation of Europe

As we have discussed, there is an increasing tendency, rather, urge, for Europeans to distinctly identify themselves as European, rather than, say, just French or German. However, we have also pointed out that the layers of primary identities are ambiguous for some Europeans, in that their Union with the European continental community does not take the place of the nationalism felt for their home country. The question is, then, where do we find nationalism in the layers of European affiliation; is it in contention with pan-Europeanism, or is it in cahoots.

There is a strong case that nationalism will prevent the greater union of Europe. Consider Germany, for example. Germany, as evinced by the 2006 World Cup, projected the image of a welcoming, friendly country dispelling the demons of its past with slogans such as the somewhat rich “Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden,” (A time to make friends). I find this interesting, considering most of the Germans I know my age harbor a deep sense of nationalist pride that stir up the echoes of a strong and dominant Prussia, often singing Prussian war songs such as “Die Wacht am Rhein” (The watch on the Rhine) in those, dare I say, drunken celebratory moments.

France, another beacon of continental-ism has trouble defining what it is to be French. Is it a strong part of a greater Europe, is it a unique identity enveloping its ties to Africa and the world, or is it strictly Gallic? Recently at a friendly football match in Paris in which the French national team played Tunisia, the French national anthem was booed, whistled and jeered at by the predominantly immigrant spectators. Far right activists such as Jean Marie le Pen point to instances like this as the failure of the liberal French national identity. French sporting officials, declared that when such things happen, 'La Marseillaise' will be immediately stopped so as to withhold the desecration of the national anthem and spirit (my words). Examples as such only highlight what I believe to be a front of unity and national universalism which misses the deep seeded national character of European peoples.

Time will only tell if Europeans can put their identities first as Europeans, then as French, German, Italian, et. al, or if they will continue to harbor such apparent national ties which are not easy to break. Indeed, Postwar illustrates the need that Europeans felt to construct an institution which would facilitate the relationships that had for so long been lacking in European culture. These relationships, one would hope, can mitigate the nationalistic pride that countries face in Europe that, as some argue, drove it to such incredible devastation two times over.

The EU: Is It Really Possible?

Is it just me, or am I the only one who finds it slightly (nay, very) funny and ironic that the French and the Germans have to work together in a collective body, despite the fact that post-war sentiment still colors most of each group’s view of the other? That the United Kingdom, with its legacy of “splendid isolation,” is now one of the most powerful entities in the Union, despite its refusal to join in regarding the single currency? That a body created in response to the need to come together in the name of economic survival now conducts roughly a third of the world’s trade as one of the most powerful trading blocs on the globe? I hope not.
To me, the European Union is an economic (and increasingly political) powerhouse born of curious contradictions. Even historically, during times when Europe has been seen as economically strong, the respective set-ups can been seen as bipolar; Europe has moved from operating on a purely competitive landscape to one whose cooperative nature is unprecedented in the region. On one hand—between the 1500’s and 1700’s, before the advent of modern, classical free trade philosophy—the European nations were mercantilist in nature, engaging in adversarial trade marked by protectionist policies and the paramount goal of increasing the home country’s bullion by limiting imports and encouraging exports, promoting the creation of colonial empires. During this time, the political landscape was mottled with conflicts and wars, fueled by this economic strategy.
The landscape now, however, seems to have cleared itself of these blemishes, for the most part at least. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 was the start of this new cooperative mindset, to which France, Italy, West Germany, and the Benelux countries were all a part. This new supranational community bolstered Europe’s post-war economic potential by integrating the said countries steel and coal industries, thus creating a common market. Further integration followed, with the merging of different communities and institutions, culminating in the formation of the European Union in 1993 with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht. Now, the EU boasts 27 members, as opposed to its original six; in fact, even the EU website is available in 23 languages. The EU has its own President, Parliament, court system, monetary unit, etc., acting, in a way, like a nation-state of its own.
As impressive as this is, I cannot help but smile at the fact that the nations of Europe, on the whole very proud nations, are willing to foster a common market with increased political integration for the sake of saving themselves. It is no surprise that cultural clashes can flare up from time to time; is it really possible for many older Frenchmen not to sneer at the sight of an Audi and for many older Germans to rush to see the next French film? I think it’s unlikely. Furthermore, the EU is not as fully integrated as it might like to portray. We all know that the UK is the anomaly of the group, as the nation that not only refuses to accept the Euro as its mode of currency, but also is not even a geographical part of continental Europe; however, it holds a great deal of sway in terms of influence and legislation. According to Tony Wright in his work British Politics: A Very Short Introduction, the UK is not even on the same page as the EU in terms of legislative and electoral process, with the UK exhibiting “winner takes-all adversarialism” and the EU exhibiting “consensus-seeking and coalition-building” behavior; “in this respect British politics is still stubbornly un-European” (Wright, 102).
I suppose that the EU can teach us something: in times of trouble, band together or die. In choosing cooperation over competition, Europe has gone from being a continent of warring nations to a regional bloc of increasingly strong economic forces, despite the fact that this amalgamation may be intrinsically unnatural to the nations involved. And though it’s quaint to this that everyone considers himself “European,” instead of “French” or “German,” I guarantee you there will be no consensus on whether escargots or sauerkraut is the better, more “European” dish.

Response to British Politics

Because the starred reading assignment for this week was Wright's "British Politics," I decided to ask a question that branches off from the book.

“Was Tony Blair’s premiership good for the United Kingdom? Why?” (Compare to Margaret Thatcher)

Tony Blair became the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in May of 1997. Not only is Blair the Labour Party's longest serving prime minister, he is also the only politician to have led the Labour Party to three consecutive general election victories. His widespread popularity for such an extended period of time, clearly points to a positive premiership. Ignoring the Iraq war fiasco in which he managed to tarnish Great Britain’s image, Blair’s premiership was good for the United Kingdom.

Thatcher had been more of an isolationist when it can to dealing with the realm of international affairs; she leaned towards an transatlantic relationship with America and was Euroskeptic. Tony Blair, on the other hand, brought Great Britain back to the for-front of the international community, specifically in his role in the War on Terror in 2001 and the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. However, in taking a tough stance against terrorism just as the President George W. Bush did, Blair came out looking like a lackey, dubbed “Bush’s poodle.”

Blair furthered this dependent image when he committed British troops to the war in Iraq. Although Blair believed he would be able to serve as a mediating factor to calm down America’s war-mongering attitudes, he was unable to do so. Instead of appearing as the international problem solver, instead Blair ended up making Britain look like a spin-less minion of the United States.

Despite what many see as his failings in the international realm, Tony Blair was able to solve numerous domestic problems. First of all, Blair reestablished and reinvented the socialist Labour party into a modern third-way Labour. The term "New Labour" was used to distinguish his pro-market policies from the more socialist, collectivist policies which the Labour party had previously supported. In creating the “Third Way,” he was able to blur the party line from British political culture. When Thatcher was in power, the “Iron Lady” stuck fast to her ideologies, even when a majority of the country was against her. Although Thatcher was more efficient in accomplishing her goals, Blair was able to move Britain away from being driven by ideologies and to better unite the country because he worked with a consensus of politicians agreeing with him at all times.

In domestic government policy, Tony Blair has been key to producing social reforms and reforming the economy. Blair introduced constitutional reform such as devolution in Wales and Scotland, a minimum wage, and tuition fees for higher education. Blair has also significantly increased public spending on the National Health System and on education and introduced market-based reforms in these two areas. The British economy has performed well under his leadership, and Blair has respected Conservative commitments not to raise income tax.

Thatcher had largely ignored the pleas for separation by dissident states. Tony Blair, on the other hand, has given much attention to compromising with these states. His contribution towards negotiating the Good Friday Agreement and assisting the Northern Ireland Peace Process after thirty years of conflict is widely recognized and favorably looked upon.

If Tony Blair’s policies on the international level are ignored, Blair’s premiership was essentially good for the domestic policies of the United Kingdom.

Is Europe a Federation?

As Judt observes, Europe is distinguished as a continent by both its compact, vaguely demarcated geography, and the intense conflict to which it has historically played host. The former of these would seem a logical precondition for the development of a federal, or at least supranational structure, which would at a minimum reduce diplomatic, economic, and social transaction costs within its borders; the latter, though indicating the existence of ethnic and cultural boundaries which often work against such endeavours, also reinforces such a body's necessity. Yet, despite the accelerating evolution of Europe towards this end, the obstacles currently being met by it are proving to be the most inert to date - and, indeed, represent the very forces which have repeatedly torn the continent apart.

Postwar, like many other analyses, attributes the origins of the EU to the European political elite's reluctant recognition, in the aftermath of two world wars, of the need to construct an intracontinental bullwark, in which member-nations would share a stake, binding them to common interests and muting the mechanisms of escalation which previously precipitated military conflict. Indeed, it was to this end that France and Germany - formerly the epicenter of continental wars - became the economic axis of the European Coal and Steel Community. In this respect, which we may call conflict-avoidance, European integration has been remarkably successful, evolving to the point where the outbreak of war between members is not just unlikely, but unthinkable. This has allowed the EU to take on, in addition to its preventionary role, one of mitigation, intervening in crises on its borders with multinational peacekeeping forces.

In many other areas - most notably economics, where the development of a single-market and advent of the Euro have created the largest economy in the world (in terms of nominal GDP) - European integration and its end-product, the EU, have proved a massive success; but, while many elites continue to press for the "final evolution" of the body into a federation, it would be inaccurate to label it as such today. The hallmarks of every federation - from the United States, to Russia, to the Empire's shadowy precursor in George Lucas' "Star Wars" - include strong (if not necessarily dominant) central government, clear delineation and distribution of powers, and the development of common and cohesive policy on important international questions. Simply put, member states of a federation must be willing to act for its good, not merely in parallel insofar as it suits their own interests.

Recent and ongoing events illustrate this. Efforts at developing a Common Defense Policy have failed, unable to overcome popular desire to retain national sovereignty. The hollowness of the Union's efforts at a Common Foreign Policy was exposed, in only the latest incident, by the cacophony of disparate reactions to Russia's invasion of Georgia. And perhaps most importantly, the successive rejections of both the European Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon, by popular referenda, demonstrated that Europeans themselves are loathe to relinquish their Westphalian conception of nationhood - much to the annoyance and embarrasment of the European political elite.

Despite this, one would be hard-pressed to argue that Europe is not closer to federation than it was in the immediate aftermath of WWII which forms the context for Postwar. The gradual process by which the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, European Community, and others led to the contemporary European Union is by no means over, and much evidence exists to suggest it is proceeding with more momentum than before as attitudes, perceptions, and world affairs develop. For the time-being, it may be wise to categorize Europe as a confederation - membership is voluntary, most supranational action is subject to ratification or review by the states in which it is applied, and those states retain a large amount of power independent of, and vis-a-vis to, the EU itself. Nevertheless, as T.R. Reid posits in "The United States of Europe," this modern Europe is becoming increasingly powerful in all aspects of world affairs - regardless of the labels or classifications we seek to attach to it.

A Different Perspective on Postwar European History

It is very interesting to read Judt’s Postwar because he provides a great picture of what was happening on the ground immediately following the German surrender in May 1945. In the various classes on world and European history I have taken, the main things we learn about what was going on in Europe immediately following World War II were the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, basically two instances of American money and power staving off misery in Europe. But we never learned much about what happened to the Jews and minority populations immediately following the war.

After the war, hundreds of thousands of people across Europe were relocated for various reasons, and the ultimate end was to create a “tidier Europe.” Judt points out that “at the conclusion of the First World War it was borders that were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in place. After 1945 what happened was rather the opposite…boundaries were left intact and people were moved instead” (27). Especially interesting were the movements of German-speaking populations themselves. The German population in Czechoslovakia, for example, was forcibly expelled to Germany from the Sudetenland. B y 1950, the German population in Bohemia and Moravia had been reduced from approximately 29 percent to 1.8 percent (26). Other nations to export their German-speaking communities en masse included Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and many lands in what was formerly the eastern portion of Germany itself. One of Hitler’s most important objectives in beginning World War II was to unify all Europe’s German diasporas in one German empire. With the consolidation of the German population in the borders of Germany, no German leader would have reason to pursue expansionist policies in order to unify the German people again.

Particularly difficult to repatriate were the surviving members of Europe’s Jewish population. They were unwanted in both Eastern and Western Europe, and many of them remained in Germany for years following the war for lack of anywhere else to go. This large Jewish population, essentially existing in a stateless limbo, was only able to find a permanent home with the creation of Israel in 1948. A massive number of Jews emigrated to Israel, a population measuring about 332,000 (32).

The reason for the relative peace that existed between the nations of postwar Western Europe and, after 1989, between all the nations of Europe that was always given was the economic integration effort of France and Germany as well as the generous American aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. However, Judt seems to suggest that another less known reason for the avoidance of another war in Europe is its new “tidiness” and ethnic homogeneity. We are beginning to see increased domestic problems in Western European nations now that there is a large influx of immigrants from places like North Africa and the Middle East, disrupting Europe’s homogeneity. Europe’s age-old difficulties dealing with minority populations came to a head in World War II, and seem to be beginning to resurface. It will be interesting to see if the proportional representation electoral system will continue to keep the peace in Europe as it becomes increasingly genuinely heterogeneous again.

Post War and the EU

In his book, Post War, Tony Judt looks at the creation of modern day Europe. He starts out with the ending of World War II and goes right up to the present time. His goal was to study how European countries and other countries in the Eurasian continent were shaped leading to their present forms economically, politically and socially.
One of the most interesting topics for me in the book was the creation of the EU and the emerging European culture. The European Union was mainly established to allow the movement and better circulation of goods between European countries. The creators of the EU saw it as a way to move the continent forward economically and promote efficiency. Next The EU was also established to create a European identity and implant certain institutions for things like health care and employment, implementing a sort of European parliament and common currency. The guidelines for the early Union were laid in the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. However, due to a lack of central leadership and control, the EU faced several problems. There were serious budget problems as many countries in the union took more than they gave in the form of farm subsides and other economic assistance. Also some members lagged behind in bringing their countries' standards up to those of the European ones
and the common currency that had been created was affecting some countries negatively. The EU attempted to deal with these problems with the Treaty of Rome in 2004. This treaty gave clearer instructions for the European standards to be established and created a constitution, making the implementing of institutions and general role of the EU government more clearly defined. The Treaty of Rome also lessened the national role in the EU government, strengthening the EU overall.
After all this, I believe that the European Union does constitute some type of federation. This union is trying to establish what it means to be European in a sense by bringing all of the different European countries under some similar institutions. However, even with its common currency and EU parliament, I do not believe that the union can be called a complete federation. Judt speaks to the fact that many people, even in Europe, are still unclear on exactly what the EU is and what it does. This system, he says, has not done a good enough job on educating its members as to what it means to be part of the EU and the full powers of the union. Next, the EU has no real established foreign policy or laws for wars between member countries. There still seems to be a emphasis on the economic policy rather than real political policies. I do not think you can call the EU a full federation as they have not established a central European identity or a common way of thinking yet and do not really have political control over the countries of Europe. Judt also mentions this as he says the culture of Europe is slowly beginning to emerge in his conclusion. Here he uses art and sports to try to show how Europe is coming together more and more. With art, he claims that many countries are beginning to see the importance of high culture and many are lending more government money to support it. Next, he says that sports like football, an important cultural event, reach across countries as players are brought in from all over the world. I agree that Europe is beginning to show more of a European identity, but there is still an overall emphasis on the individual countries themselves, not Europe as a whole. Each country retains its own kind of art, its own national sport and its national language. Although it is beginning to show now, I believe that once this European identity gets stronger the EU will move to being more of a federation and less emphasis will be placed on the country individually and more on Europe collectively, which will create more of a political power for the EU. For now the EU cannot be considered a complete federation as it lacks the power to create important polices for all of its members and the fact that people still see themselves as European second to the country they come from.

Postwar: Emergence of the Welfare State

In Postwar, the author uses the catastrophe of WWII to explain the emergence of European welfare states. He bases this claim on the renewed interest in Western Europe in state “planning” to ensure government stability and the inherent fairness of welfare systems used to combat “pre-war cynicism”. This conception of the rise of the welfare state clashes with one of our previous readings “Why doesn’t the U.S. Have a European-Style Welfare State?” in many important ways.  

Although Judt does acknowledge the existence of at least basic welfare systems present in Europe before WWII, he focuses on the growth of the more comprehensive, far-reaching systems created directly after the War. For Judt the vast destruction and instability of WWII created a cynicism and hopelessness and the need for the protection of ones livelihood through unemployment insurance and the inclusion of the middle class into social aid programs helped alleviate some of that stress.

In contrast, the Alesina article places much blame on the inherent racism and the American perception of the poor as lazy as to why the middle class have distrusted and opposed a revision of the welfare system. In addition to this claim being completely unsupported by any evidence (it is tacked on at the end and explained away by the statement “we do not know what explains these differences in beliefs”) it is contradictory to the conclusions of Judt. Though Judt acknowledges that it was easier to achieve these types of system in more homogenous countries (he gives the example of Sweden) than states like Italy, the fundamental desire to see the state as a source of relief and “agent of welfare” overrode such concerns.  

It seems Judt has the stronger argument here for to say that European countries didn’t face the same racial prejudices as the United States would be ludicrous; the violent discrimination of Hitler’s regime clearly discounts this theory. Further, many of the groups targeted for discriminated by the Nazis (for example the Gypsies) fell into the lower economic classes and so the existence of strong social programs in Germany contradicts Alesina’s assessment.  

However, some parts of both authors’ arguments do overlap. Alesina does focus on major differences in the ways individuals viewed the state due to differing historical realities in both regions. This point agrees with Judt’s assessment of the post-war state as trying to uphold citizens’ needs for an “agent of welfare, security and fairness” after a time of great upheaval. This is not to discount the United States’ role in the war effort, however, the physical destruction and proximity to major battlefields was unknown in America. Thus, though the loss of lives was great, the United States’ government did not face the same embattled citizenry who lived through six years of devastating war like the governments of Western Europe. The social pressure and need for relief did not exist in the same way in post-war America.

It would be foolish to blame the differences in the welfare systems of Western Europe and the United States on racism and discrimination as Alesina does. These concepts exist everywhere in the world and the historical differences and experiences of each region are far more compelling explanations.

Amending Classification of Regime Types

One of the most interesting ideas I came away with after reading the articles and listening to the lectures is how regime types are analyzed. As described in the Linz and Stepan article "Modern Nondemocratic Regimes", there have been three traditional categories in contemporary studies--democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian. The argument for the existence of all three was strong enough to warrant acceptance, but I was interested in figuring out how countries identified themselves as compared to how the international community identified them.

Thus, using the online United Nations database, I was able to figure out that there are only a handful of nations on the planet who do not identify themselves as democracies of some sort. Two of the major examples were Saudi Arabia and Thailand, which are, by no stretch of the imagination, non-democratic regimes. However, it was interesting to see the states that self-identified as democracies when most in the West would not consider them anywhere close to a true democracy. Iran was a specific example that was highlighted, as it is a nation notorious for consolidation of power around one person, the Ayatollah. Of course, Iran does have a parliament that is elected, but this system of “democracy” is nowhere near what democratic purists would consider acceptable. In fact, many argue that Iran is actually on the opposite end of the spectrum and is in its bare essence, a totalitarian regime. Yet because of the Iranian self-identification as a democracy, the international community’s collective stance is that the people have freedoms there. For reasons which are clear, Iran is not a true democracy that nations should strive to achieve. It is a nation that simple self-identifies as such so as not to draw criticisms from the international community like other self-identified nondemocratic regimes do.

Moving away from the Iran example, there are other nations on the lists of democracies that do not seem to be completely democratic. The addition of China on the list of democracies is puzzling to some because of the power of the Communist Party in ruling the state. However, one can argue that the classification of China as a totalitarian state is also erroneous. Thus China is the perfect example of an authoritarian nation which could be considered in the middle of the spectrum, though I would argue closer to totalitarianism rather than democracy. In addition to China, there are dozens of other examples of nations who self-identify as democratic, yet are not considered democratic by many of the nations that have longstanding and stable democracies. Thus, the problem of identification of regime types becomes apparent.

It would be nice to believe that the ultimate goal for every nation is to become liberalized and thus more democratic. In contemporary history, democracy has been viewed as the best kind of regime and government system because it puts power in the hands of the individual citizenry (at least in definition). Thus the criteria for measuring a free society—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, individual rights, and regular elections—should be used to rate how every nation is classified. If the current system employed by the United Nations is not amended, it is highly likely that progress towards liberalization and democratization will be slowed. Similarly to how there are weapons inspectors, there should be democracy inspectors. These people would travel throughout the country being analyzed and see whether or not democratic reforms are being put in place and how if they are effective. It may seem crass, but there needs to be a better way of analyzing and classifying regime types around the world.

Regime Types and its Ambiguous Category

What describes best the regime types? As many political scientists have identified, the modern definition of regime may be described as a set of ideas, interests and institutions inherited by a state. Different states have inherited different kinds of regimes based on their cultural-social values, and the influence of their political leaders. After the breakdown of Soviet Union and post-communism era in many parts of the world, scholars have competed to discuss and identify the typology of regimes and its categories. While categorizing and grouping types of regimes, many political scientists have agreed to divide the types of regimes into four to five major categories. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, in their article “Modern Nondemocratic Regimes,” conclude that there are major five different types of regimes—democratic (pluralist), totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarianism, sultanism. Difference on grouping of regimes, among scholars, has occurred because of their grouping preference and interpretation. Some scholars think that “sultanism” should be ignored, while others argue that “corporatism” should be an independent category. Based on what Linz and Stepan have provided, except “democracy” all other four types of regimes are nondemocratic regimes, and have more similarities as well.

Perhaps the democracy is already well known form of the regime, and there is no need of further explanation in identifying itself, Linz and Stepen focus on distinguishing the totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and sultanism based on their commonalities and differences. Although the actual form of government differs in various democratic-states, the democracy should consist of rule of law, a wide existence of vibrant civil society, an established electoral system, guarantee of fundamental human rights and fair judiciary system. For instance, the United States, Canada, Australia and The Great Britain can be taken as an example of democratic regimes. Democracy differs from all other regimes in many ways because it is the system of government run by elected politicians and the terms and policies vary according to the constitutional limits. Hence, there is no permanent president or ruler, policies made by one government can be replaced or improved by the others.

On the other hand; however, as Linz and Stephan distinguish the regime types based on the functional characteristics pluralism, ideology, mobilization and leadership. According to the authors, the level of pluralism; in economic and social life is legally protected under democracy, while authoritarianism has less space for its opposition. Under totalitarianism there is no space for economic, social and cultural pluralism because the official party has monopoly to the power, but the post-totalitarianism might allow little or no flexibility at all for such functions to exercise. And in sultanism, no civil society or economic development is free from the interruption of sultan. The authors make an excellent point in elaborating the existence of civil society in each regime types; however, too much emphasis has been given to the post-totalitarianism. I think most post-totalitarian regimes are not as stable as the other types of regimes because no specific examples have been given in the article. Also it can be considered as the period of transition from one type of regime to another.

Linz and Stepan also argue that ideology and level of mobilization are highly different among regimes. Under democracy there is profound commitment for citizens and a rule of law, and respect and protection for rights, and vibrant civil society. Authoritarian seem to ignore the ideology and does not offer significant political mobilization because they would just concerned with ruling, while totalitarian would enforce mobilization to convey the message from top to bottom. The post-totalitarian might enable legitimation and guided policy with a commitment of unrealistic society. Since the sultanism is the model of generic power inheritance, they focus on personalization and decide whatever they want by simply ignoring the outsider, and may have a very low level of mobilization.

Another point the authors make is that the nature of leadership, which is vastly different among the regimes. Unlike democracy, totalitarian strongly imposes rules to people because they are either popular or dangerous in behaviors. Post-totalitarian often rule through an established schedule within party, while authoritarian might rule with a small group of people with expected behavior. The sultanian does not provide any legal rationality, but often are forceful and deserving by system. Linz and Stepan lack the specific examples for the particular leadership. I think another missing point was the judiciary system among regimes. Totalitarians and sultanians almost have no judiciary at all because of their harsh character.

Leaving the corporatist type of regime along with the democracy, the authors have made a big mistake because not every democratic country in the world is oligarchic and not even exactly same to each other. Every country, based on its political culture, has different type of regime. Even within the democratic regime type, virtually every democratic country has some kinds of differences on their governing styles. Therefore, under other types of regimes, there are plenty of differences beyond few similarities, which I think is most important factor to look for. Since there is no such unique formula to categorize the regimes in specific types, understanding the fundamental concept of different types of regimes and comparing and contrasting their characters to understand their nature is more important than the categorizing itself.

Implications of American Lens on US Foreign Policy

In his essay “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Fareed Zakaria makes the distinction between democracy and constitutional liberalism. Democracy, he posits, is flourishing in the world as the prime form of government. That is, democracy is abundant as a form of government that holds competitive, multiparty elections. However, many democracies do not exhibit the form of constitutional liberalism which protects the inalienable rights of its citizens, has equality under the law, has impartial courts, freedom of speech and religion, and establishes a separation of powers that preserves checks and balances on the distribution and manipulation of power
Mr. Zakaria posits this distinction, I believe, from a strong American platform. That is, all the qualifications that define constitutional liberalism as existing within a democracy are understood as American attributes. That is not to say that British, Canada, or other successful democracies in Western Europe do not exhibit these characteristics of constitutional liberalism. However, constitutional liberalism in a democracy can best be framed within the unique cultural and historical grounding on which America was formed.
The drafters of the constitution of the United States implanted liberal ideas of how democracy should work in their new republic. The oppression of the British crown instilled the idea of personal freedom in which the government should stay out of the business of its citizens. Jefferson studied Montesquieu and his theories of the separation of powers. John Adams used his knowledge of British rule to conclude that one sole legislative branch is too flaky, and is too much liable to the avarices of men. American constitutionalism, it seems, lends itself to the unique historical narrative which utilized the ideas European predecessors. Accordingly, an American’s conception of democracy is inherently tied into the ideas of constitutional liberalism.
What does this say about Mr. Zakaria’s article? My answers are based mainly on Mr. Zakaria’s conclusion at the end of the article. First, he is right in drawing a distinction between democracy as the foundation of government and constitutional liberalism as its structure; these are distinct characteristic. Second, however, Mr. Zakaria unreasonably relates the lack of constitutional liberalism in supposedly democratic regimes as a threat to Democracy itself and American foreign policy. This, I think, taps a pervasive problem in American foreign policy that implies America must make the world a peaceful place through the propagation of democracy and the gradual movement to liberal constitutionalism. America should not be the arbiter of what good government is, nor should it take on the heavy burden of making sure other peoples around the world are living under liberal constitutionalism. Though his analysis is strong, I feel that his implications are too broad.

What Democracy Is...and Is Not

Schmitter and Karl's "What Democracy Is...and Is Not" is a collection of the broadest possible terms and concepts that can be applied uniformly to any modern democracy.  Unfortunately, in an attempt to present a definition of democracy that is acceptable to nearly all nations claiming this status, their piece actually render the term useless.

The first section of the essay describes characteristics (ruler, public realm) that the authors themselves acknowledge to be applicable not only to just nominal democracies but to authoritarian and other types of systems as well.  Though they attempt to further nail down a concrete definition through their use of elections and citizenship these too could be applied to a number of non-democracies.  Many regimes in the past have held on to the semblance of elections and granted near universal suffrage but no one could call Panama under Noriega or Mugabe's current rule in Zimbabwe democracies.

However, the authors do a better job at boiling down the concept of democracy with their discussion of procedures.  Even in this sections though, the broad definitions fail to make any sort of distinction between any nations claiming democratic status today.  Many nations like Russia can fit within all of these procedures but many political analysts argue over the use of the term democracy when applied to this nation.  Certainly if the term is to continue to be used in modern political discourse it has to be further defined to allow for true assessment and analysis of nations without depending on terms like "differently democratic" (243) that perilously allow for broad application without any standard for evaluation or measurement.

For Schmitter and Karl it seems that most regimes in the modern world can be classified as democracies.  Unfortunately, if we are to truly stand by this concept of democracy give the vast array of nations claiming this title, there must be further analysis of the term.