Postwar: Emergence of the Welfare State

In Postwar, the author uses the catastrophe of WWII to explain the emergence of European welfare states. He bases this claim on the renewed interest in Western Europe in state “planning” to ensure government stability and the inherent fairness of welfare systems used to combat “pre-war cynicism”. This conception of the rise of the welfare state clashes with one of our previous readings “Why doesn’t the U.S. Have a European-Style Welfare State?” in many important ways.  

Although Judt does acknowledge the existence of at least basic welfare systems present in Europe before WWII, he focuses on the growth of the more comprehensive, far-reaching systems created directly after the War. For Judt the vast destruction and instability of WWII created a cynicism and hopelessness and the need for the protection of ones livelihood through unemployment insurance and the inclusion of the middle class into social aid programs helped alleviate some of that stress.

In contrast, the Alesina article places much blame on the inherent racism and the American perception of the poor as lazy as to why the middle class have distrusted and opposed a revision of the welfare system. In addition to this claim being completely unsupported by any evidence (it is tacked on at the end and explained away by the statement “we do not know what explains these differences in beliefs”) it is contradictory to the conclusions of Judt. Though Judt acknowledges that it was easier to achieve these types of system in more homogenous countries (he gives the example of Sweden) than states like Italy, the fundamental desire to see the state as a source of relief and “agent of welfare” overrode such concerns.  

It seems Judt has the stronger argument here for to say that European countries didn’t face the same racial prejudices as the United States would be ludicrous; the violent discrimination of Hitler’s regime clearly discounts this theory. Further, many of the groups targeted for discriminated by the Nazis (for example the Gypsies) fell into the lower economic classes and so the existence of strong social programs in Germany contradicts Alesina’s assessment.  

However, some parts of both authors’ arguments do overlap. Alesina does focus on major differences in the ways individuals viewed the state due to differing historical realities in both regions. This point agrees with Judt’s assessment of the post-war state as trying to uphold citizens’ needs for an “agent of welfare, security and fairness” after a time of great upheaval. This is not to discount the United States’ role in the war effort, however, the physical destruction and proximity to major battlefields was unknown in America. Thus, though the loss of lives was great, the United States’ government did not face the same embattled citizenry who lived through six years of devastating war like the governments of Western Europe. The social pressure and need for relief did not exist in the same way in post-war America.

It would be foolish to blame the differences in the welfare systems of Western Europe and the United States on racism and discrimination as Alesina does. These concepts exist everywhere in the world and the historical differences and experiences of each region are far more compelling explanations.