Strong Societies and Weak States: Zimbabwe

A recent article in the Economist ("Piling on the Agony," Dec 3, 2008) details the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. A cholera epidemic is the latest in a long line of typically human-induced tragedies (e.g. famine, hyperinflation, post-election violence) that have their roots in political mismanagement. Zimbabwe is the paragon of a weak state in the Third World, whose government is more concerned with maintaining its hold on power than it is with promoting the general welfare of its people and otherwise fulfilling the basic duties of a state. The obvious reference is to Migdal's Strong Societies and Weak States. Migdal's theory is able to explain some of the political actions that President Robert Mugabe (who has been in power continuously since the 1980s) has taken to maintain his hold on power. In particular, it highlights the government's close but tenuous relationship with the military and the intentional manipulation of political appointments.

It is too soon to tell if such unrest will resume and spread or if the authorities will contain the soldiers’ anger by giving them extra perks while crushing a mutinous few. But it is plain that soldiers, the ultimate guarantor of Robert Mugabe’s power, are no longer shielded from inflation, running at hundreds of millions percent. Thousands have been told to work on farms. Many are deserting. The senior ranks—colonels and upwards—still benefit from access to farms and minerals and other business privileges, and are probably still loyal to Mr Mugabe. But a question-mark may soon start to hang over junior officers.

There are a few things to note here. The first is that the military is the ultimate guarantor of Mugabe's power. When you have rigged elections and presided over political, economic, and social crises (for over twenty years) you are bound to be an unpopular man. It is not surprising then that Mugabe would have to resort to military power to protect himself, and that he would invest so much into it rewarding and sanctioning the senior ranks in order to keep them on his side. It would be interesting to know whether they are still going to be loyal to him if, in the midst of this economic crisis, he is unable to offer them the same level of rewards they were receiving in the past. The second thing to note is the role of the junior officers, who are probably much closer than the senior officers to the society as a whole, and thus may be key to implementing the state's will in society. Their allegiance matters too.

Almost three months after a power-sharing deal was signed, there is little hope that a new government will be in place soon. Violence against the opposition continues. After more talks in South Africa, the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change at least agreed on a constitutional amendment providing for a new post of prime minister, to be held by the MDC’s leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. It will take at least another month for the change to get Parliament’s nod and be enacted. Moreover, several big issues are outstanding, including how ministries and provincial governorships will be divided among the rival parties, who will be part of a new National Security Council, and what it will do. Negotiations are expected to resume later this month. Meanwhile, Mr Mugabe has unilaterally reappointed Gideon Gono, the central bank governor presiding over the world’s highest inflation rate, for another five years.

The main competing power center in Zimbabwe politics has been the opposition party (Movement for Democratic Change) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, who was recently promised partial control of government after the contested elections this year. If you hadn't taken CPS, you might wonder why so much wrangling occurs the prime ministership and other lesser posts in government. Why doesn't strongman Mugabe just concede those seats and go on with business as usual? The most amusing question to me is, why on earth Mugabe would appoint Gideon Gono, obviously so incompetent in his post, for another five years? It all begins to make sense when you think of government positions as constituting a competing center of power; Mugabe is afraid that if (relatively) competent people come into power, they may become more popular and legitimate than him and constitute a threat to his hold on power.

There are other theories that can be used to explain the situation in Zimbabwe that deserve brief mention. The fact that it is an illiberal democracy means that Robert Mugabe probably had little interest in maintaining popular support in the first place. It doesn't matter very much how popular you are if you are going to win the election. But I will leave that for you to discuss.

"Democracy and the Downturn"

From the Economist, Nov 15 - Nov 21 2008, "Democracy and the Downturn"

I thought this was an interesting article because it examines poling data from the Latinobarometro poll of South and Central American peoples' views of their governments. Historically, this is a region which has not seen strong democracies until very recently, and even now many of those democracies may not be considered entirely free--demonstrated, for example, by the recent elections in Nicaragua.

The Latinobarmetro poll does show that, since the poll in 2001 (which is when they had their last economic crisis) people's faith in democracy in 12 of the 16 states surveyed has increased. However, only in 5 states have those numbers exceeded the 1996 poll--and those nations are ones which have seen recent democratic victories, such as success against Hugo Chavez's referendum for constitutional change in Venezuela, or Alvaro Uribe's success against the FARC, or in Paraguay where the long ruling Colorado Party was displaced by the election of Fernando Lugo.

The worry is, with the current global economic crisis deepening, whether or not these democratic successes and faith in the democratic system will continue. In many of these states, people adopt a performance legitimacy view, and the numbers of this year were taken before the effects of the crisis had fully unraveled. If their governments are unable to deal with the crisis, that may produce openings for strongmen like Chavez to take control.

Indeed, half of those polled stated that they would not mind a non-democratic government if it solved economic problems; a similar proportion said that democracy has not reduced inequalities in the region; while another 30% said there was not equality before the law.

I think this poll helps give understanding to the importance not just of democratic institutions, but of economic stability and rule of law in establishing democratic rule. In many poor Central American states, democracy has never been able to fully take hold because of the deep rooted socioeconomic inequalities--70% polled agreed that governments favor the interests of the privileged few. It remains to be seen whether Latin America will be able to consolidate its recent democratic gains, and speak out against those losses as in Nicaragua. If the current economic crisis is to be weathered without social and political upheaval, democracy may be the best tool of addressing inequality in the region--but only if those democratic institutions represent the interests of all.

pentagon policy reflects changing lanscape of conflict around the world

A recent Washington Post article outlined new Pentagon policy aimed at countering many of the new types of conflict facing the United States and the world. Using the term “irregular warfare,” the Pentagon is purportedly reallocating resources from “traditional combat” to more unconventional conflict, in addition to greater cooperation with foreign security forces and polities.

While I’m certainly no security studies expert, I would venture that this readjustment of the arguably most powerful force on the planet must reflect some significant shift in the nature of conflict around the world, and not just those conflicts in which the U.S. is in someway engaged. Admittedly, part of the readjustment is the result of the asymmetric power wielded by the U.S. military and those who would challenge it, forcing terrorists, etc to resort to nontraditional methods of engagement. At the same time, part of the readjustment may be attributed to the rise in “minor conflicts” as quantified by the UCDP reports discussed in lecture. Not only does the shift in policy reflect the vast increase in the ratio of minor to major conflict, but also the changing nature of conflict. The report cited in the Washington Post article identifies challenges such as terrorist networks, drug cartels and other non-state actors as now meriting as much Pentagon attention and resources as traditional enemy combatants. In support of the findings of Laitin and Fearon, the report identifies environments of “weak and failing” states as presenting the greatest threat to international security.

Another interesting reading of this article might be from the perspective of globalization theories. The new Pentagon Policy seeks to establish a “global network” of official security forces and intelligence agencies, aided presumably by rapidly sharing information. Moreover, more focus is being placed on language training for U.S. military personnel. All of this is in an effort to bolster local security forces abroad, in hopes that strong and secure states will provide less opportunity for threats like Al-Qaeda to develop.

Parliamentary System... No thanks.

In “Harper Suspends Canada Parliament to Avert Defeat,” Theophilos Argitis and Greg Quinn discuss the situation in Canada whereby its Parliament is at odds with its Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. The situation is so critical that Parliament is threatening to replace the current government with a new coalition. Harper has responded by suspending Parliament to stave off such an occurrence.
This situation represents both the positives and negatives of proportional parliamentary representation. On one hand, it shows the flexibility of the system to replace leaders who are at odds with the will of the people. Harper reneged on his campaign promise to address labor rights and political funding. Furthermore, many feel he is not doing an adequate job addressing the current economic crisis. Thus, members of the opposition parties and some from his own Conservative Party feel strongly that he should be replaced. Therefore, by the end of this process, Canada, in theory, should have a new Prime Minister who will better serve the interests of the nation.
On the other hand, this trait of a parliamentary system leads to a diversion from the actual issues plaguing the nation. As the top story facing Canada now, its politicians are focused entirely on what the prospects are of the challenge. This struggle, as a result of the hyper-competitiveness between parties in a multi-party proportional representation system, has led to a virtual shutdown of Canada’s government as Harper suspended Parliament in an effort to avoid being ousted.
Thus, while proportional representation gives many groups a voice in the political process, it also increases the chances of political dialogue which can cripple government progress.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a3JbAFqGjgoM&refer=home

African violence = ethnic violence?

In their article “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Brubaker and Laitin argue that two major factors have caused the more recent ethnicization of conflicts that entail the use of violence. According to them the first is the “decay of the Weberian state” whereby the state is incapable of repressing violence of any kind, including ethnic violence. The second is the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and, with it, the ideological framing of conflicts.

In the news today, the front page of The New York Times runs a story headlined “Rwanda Stirs Deadly Brew of Troubles in Congo” that lacks any form of non-ethnic reasoning. The article focuses on Rwanda’s past ethnic struggles and the role that the Congo has played in sheltering ex-genocidaires. It states how “mainly Tutsi” Rwandan soldiers are streaming into the Congo to pay back the Hutus that “want to come back and finish the job.” What is mentioned but never emphasized is that this conflict has a backdrop of a struggle for power and natural resources. Rwanda is a small state highly populated and perennially poor, while its large neighbor, although one of the poorest states in Africa, has a natural supply of valuable minerals and resources that give it a large potential for wealth. For the last decade, the Congo has been in a constant state of unrest fueled by various political agendas, as well as conflicts over the control of water and other resources.

The heavy death toll in the Congo over the last 10 years reaches now to over 5.4 million, the deadliest since World War II. While the article mentions that the Rwandan genocide launched the then Zaire into turmoil due to the heavy influx of refugees, it fails to mention that the vast majority of these deaths have been non-violent losses – caused by malnutrition and preventable health conditions that were untended during the turmoil. Instead, the article would make it appear as though the conflict is a continuation of Rwandan genocide when over 800,000 Tutsis were killed for being Tutsis in 100 days.

Therefore, I argue that, as Brubaker and Laitin contend, the Congo is incapable of repressing the rebel forces at all - either helped by Rwandans or not. Unfortunately, its own Congolese military is blamed for much of the looting and raping of women in Goma. Furthermore, with the scar of an appalling ethnic conflict in the region it easy to categorize the violence in an ethnic framework. It appears that this classification has finally brought attention to the conflict that has been waging for the last 10 years. Yet, it may be problematic if policy makers try to diffuse tensions between ethnic groups rather than supply healthcare and food for the hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees within the country, both Hutu and Tutsi.

YAY BIG BOOK.

To say the very least, Strong Societies and Weak States is not light reading. I’m not going to lie; in trudging through these 277 pages, I have only developed a perfunctory understanding of the intricacies of Migdal’s thesis. I don’t seriously believe any one of use can really figure what exactly what his model is and rationalize the various case studies that he has used to support his thesis.
In the most abbreviated encapsulation, this book seeks to examine why it is that a majority of Third World countries have been mired in what appears to be a constant process state disintegration following postcolonial nation building. By drawing heavily from the cases of Israel, Sierra Leone, and Egypt, and sampling liberally from countries such as Mexico, India, Nigeria, South Africa and others, Migdal develops a model centered on the relation between localized interests (power brokers, chieftains, etc.) and the state apparatus, and the struggle to define the policies of the nation-state in a way that leads to change in society as achieving greater prosperity, dignity, and equity.
In particular, I found the case studies of Israel and Sierra Leone to be particularly fascinating. Both countries were former British possessions, and were left in a state of intense fragmentation and general chaos following independence. Summarizing, it seems that an inflow of funds and resources in both countries created distinctly different results because they fell into different hands. In the case of Israel, Zionist labor leaders transferred funds into the Histradut and gave Ben-Gurion the necessary resources to unite Palestine under the Israeli flag. However, in Sierra Leone, British dismantling of traditional power arrangements and the haphazard transferring of resources to local chieftains created a society ripe for fragmentation. As such, over the course of the post-colonialism period, Sierra Leone has lacked a strong state apparatus because the national leaders have had to accommodate towards the demands of localized power brokers. This in turn has curtailed the effectiveness of the state to develop an effective bureaucracy barring some jarring social dislocation.
This I can deal with. I do have one question, however. In all the states analyzed, it seems that only Israel succeeded. What about cases such as China (you knew I would pick that)? Following the Second World War, it was not the inflow of resources from Japanese imperialists or Americans that created the climate for a strong state. In fact, for all the money that the U.S. dumped into the Nationalists, the Communists (who were comparatively underfunded by the Russians) still managed to prevail and create a strong state from a nation fragmented for over a hundred years.
All in all, I don’t disagree with Migdal’s thesis because quite frankly, I don’t understand it to the point of argument. However, I would have appreciated if he presented a couple more successful Third World models. Other than that, it’s definitely better than reading the toothpaste container in the bathroom.

Strength of the State

In Joel Migdal’s work Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World he discusses the reasons why most Third World countries have failed to become strong states. He expresses the importance of colonial backgrounds and influences from former parent countries. These states existed primarily to provide for the needs of the 18^th and 19^th parent states’ economies, thus their local financial and social well-being was not a crucial concern to imperialists thousands of miles away. How, then, can a state with such a background move forward to effectively govern its varied peoples?

The imperialists’ lack of foresight in most of the nations they occupied led to strong internal divisions, which have complicated and prevented much state development. They did not concern themselves with negotiating between local ethnic or tribal groups. These groups, they did not understand, are vital to the maintenance of state control beyond the key cities. As Migdal points out, “strong Third World societies, then, are not mere putty to be molded by states with sufficient technical resources, managerial abilities, and committed personnel” (36). Such a statement is proven not only in colonial society, but also in today’s world. When one considers the situation in Iraq, such a statement is especially true. A strong state, Midgal would contend, requires that its leaders understand and work with the various minority groups within its borders. He states that as Third World countries are noticeably more ethnically diverse than First World countries.

The best way for leaders to do so is to construct political agencies with the power to make large scale strategic choices affecting all of the separate groups in the country. These agencies would need to be far reaching and capable of understanding the multitude of interests in regions that may be far from the seat of government. Only through these can a government hope to simultaneously consolidate and expand its power to effectively maintain central social and political control.